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Abstract. Quasi-adaptive non-interactive zero-knowledge (QA-NIZK) proofs is a powerful paradigm,
suggested recently by Jutla and Roy (Asiacrypt ’13), which is motivated by the Groth-Sahai seminal
techniques for efficient non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs. In this paradigm, the common
reference string may depend on specific language parameters, a fact that allows much shorter proofs
in important cases. It even makes certain standard model applications competitive with the Fiat-
Shamir heuristic in the Random Oracle idealization (such QA-NIZK proofs were recently optimized to
constant size by Jutla and Roy (Crypto ’14) and Libert et al. (Eurocrypt ’14) for the important case
of proving that a vector of group elements belongs to a linear subspace). While, e.g., the QA-NIZK
arguments of Libert et al. provide unbounded simulation-soundness and constant proof length, their
simulation-soundness is only loosely related to the underlying assumption (with a gap proportional to
the number of adversarial queries) and it is unknown how to alleviate this limitation without sacrificing
efficiency. Here, we deal with the basic question of whether and to what extent we can simultaneously
optimize the proof size and the tightness of security reductions, allowing for important applications
with tight security (which are typically to date quite lengthy) to be of shorter size. In this paper, we
resolve this question by describing a novel simulation-sound QA-NIZK argument showing that a vector
v ∈ Gn belongs to a subspace of rank t < n using a constant number of group elements. Unlike previous
constant-size QA-NIZK proofs of such statements, the unbounded simulation-soundness of our system
is nearly tightly related (i.e., the reduction only loses a factor proportional to the security parameter)
to the standard Decision Linear assumption. To show simulation-soundness in the constrained context
of tight reductions, we employ a number of techniques, and explicitly point at a technique – which may
be of independent interest – of hiding the linear span of a structure-preserving homomorphic signature
(which is part of an OR proof). As an application, we design a public-key cryptosystem with almost
tight CCA2-security in the multi-challenge, multi-user setting with improved length (asymptotically
optimal for long messages). We also adapt our scheme to provide CCA security in the key-dependent
message scenario (KDM-CCA2) with ciphertext length reduced by 75% when compared to the best
known tightly secure KDM-CCA2 system so far.
Keywords. Security tightness, constant-size QA-NIZK proofs, simulation-soundness, chosen-ciphertext
security, threshold cryptosystems, KDM-CCA2 security, UC commitments, bilinear groups, Decision
Linear assumption.
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1 Introduction
In this paper, we consider the problem of achieving (almost) tight security in short simulation-
sound non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs and chosen-ciphertext-secure encryption. While tight
security results are known in both cases [34,37], they incur quite long proofs and ciphertexts.
A natural question is to develop tools and techniques to make them short and, in the process,
develop deeper understanding of this highly constrained setting. As an answer in this direction,
we describe space-efficient methods and constructions with almost tight security. For the specific
problem of proving that a vector of group elements belongs to a linear subspace, our main result
is the first constant-size NIZK arguments whose simulation-soundness tightly relates to a standard
assumption.
Tight and Almost Tight Security. Any public-key system has to rely on some hardness
assumption. In order to provide concrete guarantees, the security proof should preferably give a
tight reduction from a well-established assumption. Namely, a successful adversary should imply
a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm breaking the assumption with nearly the same
advantage. Tightness matters because the loss in the security reduction may necessitate the use of
a larger (at times prohibitively larger) security parameter to counteract the loss. The importance
of tightness was first advocated by Bellare and Rogaway [10] in the context of digital signatures
18 years ago. Since then, it received a continuous attention with a flurry of positive and negative
results in the random oracle model [24,25,45,23,59,1,43] and in the standard model [59,38,13,6].
A highly challenging problem has been to obtain tight security under standard assumptions in
the standard model. For many primitives, satisfactory solutions have remained elusive until very
recently. Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [7] raised the problem of constructing a chosen-ciphertext-
secure public-key cryptosystem based on a standard assumption and whose exact security does
not degrade with the number of users or the number of challenge ciphertexts. The first answer
to this question was only given more than a decade later by Hofheinz and Jager [37] and it was
more a feasibility result than a practical solution. In the context of identity-based encryption
(IBE), Chen and Wee [22] designed the first “almost tightly” secure system —meaning that the
degradation factor only depends on the security parameter λ, and not on the number q of adversarial
queries— based on a simple assumption in the standard model,5 which resolved an 8-year-old open
problem [61].
NIZK Proofs and Simulation-Soundness. Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs [14] are cru-
cial tools used in the design of countless cryptographic protocols. In the standard model, truly effi-
cient constructions remained lacking until the last decade, when Groth and Sahai [35] gave nearly
practical non-interactive witness indistinguishable (NIWI) and zero-knowledge (NIZK) proof sys-
tems for a wide class of languages in groups endowed with a bilinear map. While quite powerful,
their methods remain significantly more costly than the non-interactive proof heuristics enabled by
the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [28] in the idealized random oracle model [9]. recently, Jutla and Roy [41]
showed that important efficiency improvements are possible for quasi-adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK)
proofs, i.e., where the common reference string (CRS) may depend on the specific language for which
proofs are being generated but a single CRS simulator works for the entire class of languages. For
the specific task of proving that a vector of n group elements belongs to a linear subspace of rank
t, Jutla and Roy [41] gave computationally sound QA-NIZK proofs of length Θ(n − t) where the
5 Using random oracles, Katz and Wang [45] previously gave a tightly secure variant of the Boneh-Franklin IBE [17].
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Groth-Sahai (GS) techniques entail Θ(n+ t) group elements per proof. They subsequently refined
their techniques, reducing the proof’s length to a constant [42], regardless of the number of equa-
tions or the number of variables. Libert et al. [48] independently obtained similar improvements
using different techniques.
The design of non-malleable protocols, primarily IND-CCA2-secure encryption schemes, at
times appeals to NIZK proofs endowed with a property named simulation-soundness by Sahai [58]:
informally, an adversary should remain unable to prove a false statement by itself, even with
the help of an oracle generating simulated proofs for (possibly false) adversarially-chosen state-
ments. Groth [34] and Camenisch et al. [19] extended the Groth-Sahai techniques so as to obtain
simulation-sound NIZK proofs. Their techniques incur a substantial overhead due to the use of
quadratic pairing product equations, OR proofs or IND-CCA2-secure encryption schemes. It was
shown [44,50,40] that one-time simulation-soundness —where the adversary obtains only one sim-
ulated proof— is much cheaper to achieve than unbounded simulation-soundness (USS). When it
comes to proving membership of linear subspaces, Libert, Peters, Joye and Yung [48] gave very
efficient unbounded simulation-sound quasi-adaptive NIZK proofs which do not require quadratic
pairing product equations or IND-CCA2-secure encryption. Interestingly, their USS QA-NIZK ar-
guments have constant size, regardless of the dimensions of the considered subspace. Unfortunately,
the simulation-soundness of their proof system does not tightly reduce to the underlying assump-
tion. The multiplicative gap between the reduction’s probability of success and the adversary’s
advantage depends on the number q of simulated proofs observed by the adversary. As a conse-
quence, the results of [48] do not imply tight chosen-ciphertext security [37] in a scenario —first
envisioned by Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [7]— where the adversary obtains polynomially many
challenge ciphertexts. As of now, USS proof systems based on OR proofs [34,37] are the only ones
to enable tight security in this setting and it is unclear how to render them as efficient as [48] for
linear multi-exponentiation equations.
Tightness and Chosen-Ciphertext Security. Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [7] provided
evidence that, if a public-key cryptosystem is secure in the sense of the one-user, one-challenge
security definition [57], it remains secure in a more realistic multi-user setting where the adversary
obtains polynomially many challenge ciphertexts. Their reduction involves a loss of exact security
which is proportional to the number of users and the number of challenge ciphertexts. They also
showed that, in the Cramer-Shoup encryption scheme [27], the degradation factor only depends on
the number of challenges per user. More recently, Hofheinz and Jager [37] used a tightly secure
simulation-sound proof system to construct the first IND-CCA2 secure encryption system whose
IND-CCA security tightly reduces to a standard assumption in the multi-user, multi-challenge
setting. Due to very large ciphertexts, their scheme was mostly a feasibility result and the same
holds for the improved constructions of Abe et al. [4]. Until recently, the only known CCA2-
secure encryption schemes with tight security in the multi-challenge, multi-user setting either relied
on non-standard q-type assumptions [36] —where the number of input elements depends on the
number of adversarial queries— or incurred long ciphertexts [37,4] comprised of hundreds of group
elements (or both). One of the reasons is that solutions based on standard assumptions [37,4,49]
build on simulation-sound proof systems relying on OR proofs. Recently, Libert et al. [49] gave
an almost tightly IND-CCA2 system in the multi-challenge setting where, despite their use of
OR proofs, ciphertexts only require 69 group elements under the Decision Linear assumption.
Unfortunately, their result falls short of implying constant-size simulation-sound QA-NIZK proofs
of linear subspace membership since each vector coordinate would require its own proof elements.
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In particular, the technique of [49] would result in long proofs made of O(λ) group elements in the
setting of key-dependent message CCA2 security, where O(1) group elements per proof suffices [42,
Section 6] if we accept a loose reduction.
Our Contributions. We present short QA-NIZK proofs of linear subspace membership (moti-
vated by those in [48,42]) where the unbounded simulation-soundness property can be almost tightly
—in the terminology of Chen and Wee [22]— related to the standard Decision Linear (DLIN) as-
sumption [15]. As in [22], the loss of concrete security only depends on the security parameter, and
not on the number of simulated proofs obtained by the adversary, which solves a problem left open
in [48]. Our construction only lengthens the QA-NIZK proofs of Libert et al. [48] by a factor of 2
and thus retains the constant proof length of [48], independently of the dimensions of the subspace.
In particular, it does not rely on an IND-CCA2-secure encryption scheme —which, in this context,
would require a tightly secure CCA2 cryptosystem to begin with— and it does not even require
quadratic equations.
Building on our QA-NIZK proofs and the Naor-Yung paradigm [55], we obtain a new public-
key encryption scheme which is proved IND-CCA2-secure in the multi-challenge, multi-user setting
under the Decision Linear assumption via an almost tight reduction. While the reduction is slightly
looser than those of [37,4], our security bound does not depend on the number of users or the
number of challenges, so that our scheme is as secure in the multi-challenge, multi-user scenario
as in the single-challenge, single-user setting. Like [37,4], our construction features publicly recog-
nizable well-formed ciphertexts, which makes it suitable for non-interactive threshold decryption.
Moreover, our ciphertexts are much shorter than those of [37,4] as they only consist of 48 group
elements under the DLIN assumption, whereas the most efficient construction based on the same
assumption [49] entails 69 group elements per ciphertext.
Our constant-size proofs offer much more dramatic savings when it comes to encrypting long
messages without affecting the compatibility with zero-knowledge proofs. Indeed, we can encrypt
N group elements at once while retaining short proofs, which only takes 2N + 46 group elements
per ciphertext. The asymptotic expansion ratio of 2 – which is inherent to the Naor-Yung technique
– is thus optimal. To our knowledge, all prior results on tight CCA2 security would incur Θ(N) ele-
ments per proof and thus a higher expansion rate in this situation. In turn, our encryption schemes
imply tightly secure non-interactive universally composable (UC) commitments [26,20] with adap-
tive security in the erasure model. In particular, using the same design principle as previous UC
commitments [51,29,41] based on CCA2-secure cryptosystems, our scheme for long messages allows
committing to N group elements at once with a two-fold expansion rate.
Using our QA-NIZK proof system, we also construct an almost tightly secure encryption scheme
with key-dependent message chosen-ciphertext security (KDM-CCA2) [11,18] —in the sense of
[19]— with shorter ciphertexts. Analogously to the Jutla-Roy construction [42, Section 6], our sys-
tem offers substantial savings w.r.t. [19] as it allows for constant-size proofs even though, due to
the use of the Boneh et al. approach [18] to KDM security, the dimension of underlying vectors of
group elements depends on the security parameter. Unlike [42], however, the KDM-CCA2 security
of our scheme is almost tightly related to the DLIN assumption. So far, the most efficient tightly
KDM-CCA2 system was implied by the results of Hofheinz-Jager [37] and Abe et al. [4], which
incur rather long proofs. Our QA-NIZK proofs yield ciphertexts that are about 75% shorter, as we
show in Appendix G.
Our Techniques. Our simulation-sound QA-NIZK arguments (as the construction in [48]) build
on linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures (LHSPS) [47]. In [48], each proof of sub-
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space membership is a Groth-Sahai NIWI proof of knowledge of a homomorphic signature on the
vector v whose membership is being proved. The security analysis relies on the fact that, with
some probability, all simulated proofs take place on a perfectly NIWI Groth-Sahai CRS while the
adversary’s fake proof pertains to a perfectly binding CRS. Here, in order to do this without ap-
plying Waters’ partitioning method [61] to the CRS space as in [52], we let the prover generate
a Groth-Sahai CRS F = (f1,f2,F ) of its choice, for vectors of group elements f1,f2,F ∈ G3,
and first prove that this CRS is perfectly binding (i.e., its last vector F lives in span〈f1,f2〉). This
seemingly additional “freedom” that we give the prover ends up allowing a stronger simulator (tight
simulation-soundness).
Simulation-soundness is, in fact, obtained by having the prover demonstrate that either: (i) The
prover’s CRS F is perfectly binding; or (ii) The prover knows a signature which only the NIZK
simulator would be able to compute using some simulation trapdoor. One key idea is that, since the
latter OR proof involves a relatively short statement (namely, the membership of a two-dimensional
subspace) which the adversary has no control on, it can be generated using a constant number of
group elements and using only linear pairing product equations.
In order to efficiently prove the above OR statement, we leverage the algebraic properties of
a variant of the Chen-Wee signature scheme [22], which was proved almost tightly secure under
the DLIN assumption, recently proposed by Libert, Joye, Yung and Peters [49]. In short, the real
prover computes a pseudo-signature σ (without knowing the signing key) on the verification key of
a one-time signature and uses the real witnesses to prove that F is a perfectly binding CRS. In con-
trast, the simulator computes a real signature σ using the private key instead of the real witnesses.
In order to make sure that simulated proofs will be indistinguishable from real proofs, we apply a
technique —implicitly used in [49]— consisting of hiding the linear subspace from where a partially
committed vector of group elements defined by the signature σ is chosen: while a pseudo-signature
fits within a proper subspace of a linear space specified by the public key, real signatures live in
the full linear space. A difference between our approach and the one of [49] is our non-modular
and more involved use of the signature scheme, yet the technique we point at above may be useful
elsewhere. Our QA-NIZK CRS actually contains the description of a linear subspace which mixes
the public key components of the signature and vectors used to build the prover’s Groth-Sahai CRS
F. In order to implement the OR proof, our idea is to make sure that the only way to prove a non-
perfectly-binding CRS F is to compute the committed σ as a real signature for a legally modified
public key. By “legally modified key,” we mean that some of its underlying private components may
be scaled by an adversarially-chosen factor x ∈ Zp as long as the adversary also outputs gx. While
we rely on an unusual security property of the signature which allows the adversary to tamper with
the public key, this property can be proved under the standard DLIN assumption in the scheme
of [49]. This unusual property is a crucial technique allowing us to prove the OR statement about
the ephemeral CRS F without using quadratic equations.
In turn, the simulation-soundness relies on the fact that, unless some security property of the
signature of [49] is broken, the adversary still has to generate its fake proof on a perfectly binding
CRS. If this condition is satisfied, we can employ the arguments as in [48] to show that the reduction
is able to extract a non-trivial homomorphic signature, thus breaking the DLIN assumption.
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2 Background and Definitions
2.1 Hardness Assumptions
We consider groups (G,GT ) of prime-order p endowed with a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT . In this
setting, we rely on the standard Decision Linear assumption.
Definition 1 ([15]). The Decision Linear Problem (DLIN) in G, is to distinguish the distributions
(ga, gb, gac, gbd, gc+d) and (ga, gb, gac, gbd, gz), with a, b, c, d
R← Zp, z R← Zp. The DLIN assumption
asserts the intractability of DLIN for any PPT distinguisher.
We also use the following problem, which is at least as hard as DLIN [21].
Definition 2. The Simultaneous Double Pairing problem (SDP) in (G,GT ) is, given group el-
ements (gz, gr, hz, hu) ∈ G4, to find a non-trivial triple (z, r, u) ∈ G3\{(1G, 1G, 1G)} such that
e(z, gz) · e(r, gr) = 1GT and e(z, hz) · e(u, hu) = 1GT .
2.2 Quasi-Adaptive NIZK Proofs and Simulation-Soundness
Quasi-Adaptive NIZK (QA-NIZK) proofs are NIZK proofs where the CRS is allowed to depend on
the specific language for which proofs have to be generated. The CRS is divided into a fixed part
Γ , produced by an algorithm K0, and a language-dependent part ψ. However, there should be a
single simulator for the entire class of languages.
Let λ be a security parameter. For public parameters Γ ← K0(λ), let DΓ be a probability
distribution over a collection of relations R = {Rρ} parametrized by a string ρ with an associated
language Lρ = {x | ∃w : Rρ(x,w) = 1}.
We consider proof systems where the prover and the verifier both take a label lbl as additional
input. For example, this label can be the message-carrying part of an ElGamal-like encryption.
Formally, a tuple of algorithms (K0,K1,P,V) is a QA-NIZK proof system for R if there exists a
PPT simulator (S1, S2) such that, for any PPT adversaries A1,A2 and A3, we have the following
properties:
Quasi-Adaptive Completeness:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ); (x,w, lbl)← A1(Γ, ψ, ρ); pi ← P(ψ, x,w, lbl) :
V(ψ, x, pi, lbl) = 1 if Rρ(x,w) = 1] = 1 .
Quasi-Adaptive Soundness:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ); (x, pi, lbl)← A2(Γ, ψ, ρ) :
V(ψ, x, pi, lbl) = 1 ∧ ¬(∃w : Rρ(x,w) = 1)] ∈ negl(λ) .
Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge:
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; ψ ← K1(Γ, ρ) : AP(ψ,.,.)3 (Γ, ψ, ρ) = 1]
≈ Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); ρ← DΓ ; (ψ, τsim)← S1(Γ, ρ) : AS(ψ,τsim,.,.,.)3 (Γ, ψ, ρ) = 1] ,
where
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– P(ψ, ., ., .) emulates the actual prover. It takes as input (x,w) and lbl and outputs a proof pi
if (x,w) ∈ Rρ. Otherwise, it outputs ⊥.
– S(ψ, τsim, ., ., .) is an oracle that takes as input (x,w) and lbl. It outputs a simulated proof
S2(ψ, τsim, x, lbl) if (x,w) ∈ Rρ and ⊥ if (x,w) 6∈ Rρ.
We assume that the CRS ψ contains an encoding of ρ, which is thus available to V. The definition
of Quasi-Adaptive Zero-Knowledge requires a single simulator for the entire family of relations R.
The property called simulation-soundness [58] requires that the adversary remain unable to
prove false statements even after having seen simulated proofs for potentially false statements. We
consider the strongest form, called unbounded simulation-soundness (USS) as opposed to one-time
simulation-soundness, where the adversary is allowed to see polynomially many simulated proofs.
In order to use QA-NIZK proofs in a modular manner without degrading the exact security
of our constructions, we will require simulation-soundness to hold even if the adversary A4 has
a trapdoor τm that allows deciding membership in the language Lρ. We thus assume that the
algorithm DΓ outputs a language parameter ρ and a trapdoor τm that allows recognizing elements
of Lρ. This trapdoor τm is revealed to A4 and should not help prove false statements.
Enhanced Unbounded Simulation-Soundness: For any PPT adversary A4,
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); (ρ, τm)← DΓ ; (ψ, τsim)← S1(Γ, ρ); (x, pi, lbl)← AS2(ψ,τsim,.,.)4 (Γ, ψ, ρ, τm) :
V(ψ, x, pi, lbl) = 1 ∧ ¬(∃w : Rρ(x,w) = 1) ∧ (x, pi, lbl) 6∈ Q] ∈ negl(λ) ,
where the adversary is allowed unbounded access to an oracle S2(ψ, τ, ., .) that takes as input
statement-label pairs (x, lbl) (where x may be outside Lρ) and outputs simulated proofs pi ←
S2(ψ, τsim, x, lbl) before updating the set Q = Q ∪ {(x, pi, lbl)}, which is initially empty.
The standard notion of soundness can be enhanced in a similar way, by handing the membership
testing trapdoor τm to A2. In the weaker notion of one-time simulation-soundness, only one query
to the S2 oracle is allowed.
In order to achieve tight security in the multi-user setting, we also consider a notion of un-
bounded simulation-soundness in the multi-CRS setting. Namely, the adversary is given a set of
µ reference strings {ψκ}µκ=1 for language parameters {ρκ}µκ=1 and should remain unable to break
the soundness of one these after having seen multiple simulated proofs for each CRS ψκ. A stan-
dard argument shows that (enhanced) unbounded simulation-soundness in the multi CRS setting
is implied by the same notion in the single CRS setting. However, the reduction is far from being
tight as it loses a factor µ. In our construction, the random self-reducibility of the underlying hard
problems fortunately allows avoiding this security loss in a simple and natural way.
Enhanced Unbounded Simulation-Soundness in the multi-CRS setting: For any PPT ad-
versary A4, we have
Pr[Γ ← K0(λ); {ρκ, τm,κ}µκ=1 ← DΓ ; ({ψκ, τsim,κ}µκ=1)← S1(Γ, {ρκ}µκ=1);
(κ?, x, pi, lbl)← AS2({ψκ}
µ
κ=1,{τsim,κ}µκ=1,.,.,.)
4 (Γ, {ψκ, ρκ, τm,κ}µκ=1) :
V(ψκ? , x, pi, lbl) = 1 ∧ ¬(∃w : Rρκ? (x,w) = 1) ∧ (κ?, x, pi, lbl) 6∈ Q] ∈ negl(λ) .
Here, A4 has access to an oracle S2({ψκ}µκ=1, {τsim,κ}µκ=1, ., ., .) that takes as input tuples
(j, x, lbl) (where xmay be outside Lρj ) and outputs simulated proofs pi ← S2({ψκ}µκ=1, {τsim,κ}µκ=1,
j, x, lbl) for Lρj before updating the set Q = Q ∪ {(j, x, pi, lbl)}, which is initially empty.
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The standard notion of soundness extends to the multi-CRS setting in a similar way and it can be
enhanced by giving {ψκ}µκ=1 and the membership trapdoors {τm,κ}µκ=1 to the adversary. The defini-
tion of quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge readily extends as well, by having S1 output {ψκ, τsim,κ}µκ=1
while the oracle S and the simulator S2 both take an additional index j ∈ {1, . . . , µ} as input.
2.3 Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
Structure-preserving signatures [3,2] are signature schemes where messages and public keys consist
of elements in the group G of a bilinear configuration (G,GT ).
Libert et al. [47] considered structure-preserving with linear homomorphic properties (see Ap-
pendix B for formal definitions). This section reviews the one-time linearly homomorphic structure-
preserving signature (LHSPS) of [47].
Keygen(λ, n): given a security parameter λ and the subspace dimension n ∈ N, choose bilinear
group (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ. Then, choose gz, gr, hz, hu
R← G. For i = 1 to n, choose
χi, γi, δi
R← Zp and compute gi = gzχigrγi , hi = hzχihuδi . The private key is sk = {(χi, γi, δi)}ni=1
and the public key is pk =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}ni=1
) ∈ G2n+4.
Sign(sk, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): to sign a vector (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ Gn using sk = {(χi, γi, δi)}ni=1, output
σ = (z, r, u) =
(∏n
i=1M
−χi
i ,
∏n
i=1,M
−γi
i ,
∏n
i=1M
−δi
i
)
.
SignDerive(pk, {(ωi, σ(i))}`i=1): given pk as well as ` tuples (ωi, σ(i)), parse σ(i) as σ(i) =
(
zi, ri, ui
)
for i = 1 to `. Return the triple σ = (z, r, u) ∈ G3, where z = ∏`i=1 zωii , r = ∏`i=1 rωii ,
u =
∏`
i=1 u
ωi
i .
Verify(pk, σ, (M1, . . . ,Mn)): given σ = (z, r, u) ∈ G3 and (M1, . . . ,Mn), return 1 if and only if
(M1, . . . ,Mn) 6= (1G, . . . , 1G) and (z, r, u) satisfy
1GT = e(gz, z) · e(gr, r) ·
n∏
i=1
e(gi,Mi) = e(hz, z) · e(hu, u) ·
n∏
i=1
e(hi,Mi) . (1)
Our simulation-sound proof system will rely on the fact that the above scheme provides tight
security under the DLIN assumption, as implicitly shown in [47].
2.4 Short Signatures Almost Tightly Related to the DLIN Assumption
Recently, Libert et al. [49] proposed the following signature scheme which was shown almost tightly
related to the DLIN assumption. The scheme can be seen as an instantiation of a general construc-
tion suggested by Blazy et al. [13], where each signature consists of an algebraic message authen-
tication code (MAC) and a NIZK proof that the MAC is valid w.r.t. a committed key included in
the public key. In [49], the NIZK proof is a short QA-NIZK argument and the MAC is a triple of
the form (gω1+ω2 · H(V ,M)r · H(W ,M)s, f r, hs), for some hash function H(V , .) and H(W , .),
where the public key contains (Ω1, Ω2) = (u
ω1
1 , u
ω2
2 ). The description hereunder assumes symmetric
pairings.
Keygen(λ): Choose bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p together with f, g, h, u1, u2
R← G.
1. For ` = 1 to L, choose V`,0, V`,1,W`,0,W`,1
R← G to assemble row vectors
V = (V1,0, V1,1, . . . , VL,0, VL,1) ∈ G2L, W = (W1,0,W1,1, . . . ,WL,0,WL,1) ∈ G2L .
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2. Define the matrix M =
(
Mi,j
)
i,j
given by
M =

V > Idf,2L 12L×2L 12L×1 12L×1
W> 12L×2L Idh,2L 12L×1 12L×1
g 11×2L 11×2L u1 1
g 11×2L 11×2L 1 u2
 ∈ G(4L+2)×(4L+3) (2)
with Idf,2L = f
I2L ∈ G2L×2L, Idh,2L = hI2L ∈ G2L×2L, where I2L ∈ Z2L×2Lp is the identity.
3. Generate a key pair (skhsps, pkhsps) for the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Sec-
tion 2.3 in order to sign vectors of dimension n = 4L+3. Let skhsps = {(χi, γi, δi)}4L+3i=1 be the
private key, of which the corresponding public key is pkhsps =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {(gi, hi)}4L+3i=1
)
.
4. Using the LHSPS private key skhsps = {χi, γi, δi}4L+3i=1 , generate one-time homomorphic
signatures {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+2j=1 on the rows M j = (Mj,1, . . . ,Mj,4L+3) ∈ G4L+3 of M. These
are obtained as
(Zj , Rj , Uj) =
(
4L+3∏
i=1
M−χij,i ,
4L+3∏
i=1
M−γij,i ,
4L+3∏
i=1
M−δij,i
)
,
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , 4L+ 2}.
5. Choose ω1, ω2
R← Zp and compute Ω1 = uω11 ∈ G, Ω2 = uω22 ∈ G.
The private key consists of SK = (ω1, ω2) and the public key is
PK =
(
f, g, h, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W , pkhsps, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+2j=1
)
.
Sign(SK,M): Given an L-bit message M = M [1] . . .M [L] ∈ {0, 1}L and SK = (ω1, ω2):
1. Let H(V ,M) =
∏L
`=1 V`,M [`] and H(W ,M) =
∏L
`=1W`,M [`]. Choose r, s
R← Zp and compute
σ1 = g
ω1+ω2 ·H(V ,M)r ·H(W ,M)s , σ2 = f r , σ3 = hs . (3)
2. Using {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+2j=1 , derive a one-time homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) which serves
as a QA-NIZK argument showing that the vector
(σ1, σ
1−M [1]
2 , σ
M [1]
2 , . . . , σ
1−M [L]
2 , σ
M [L]
2 , σ
1−M [1]
3 , σ
M [1]
3 , . . . , σ
1−M [L]
3 , σ
M [L]
3 , Ω1, Ω2)
belongs to the row space of M, so that (σ1, σ2, σ3) is of the form (3). Namely, compute
Z = Zω14L+1 · Zω24L+2 ·
∏L
i=1
(
Zr
2i−M [i] · Z
s
2L+2i−M [i]
)
and
R = Rω14L+1 ·Rω24L+2 ·
L∏
i=1
(
Rr
2i−M [i] ·R
s
2L+2i−M [i]
)
,
U = Uω14L+1 · Uω24L+2 ·
L∏
i=1
(
U r
2i−M [i] · U
s
2L+2i−M [i]
)
.
Return the signature σ =
(
σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U
) ∈ G6.
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Verify(PK,M,σ): Parse σ as
(
σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U
) ∈ G6 and return 1 if and only if
e(gz, Z) · e(gr, R) = e(g1, σ1)−1 · e(
L∏
i=1
g2i+M [i], σ2)
−1 ·
e(
L∏
i=1
g2L+2i+M [i], σ3)
−1 · e(g4L+2, Ω1)−1 · e(g4L+3, Ω2)−1
e(hz, Z) · e(hu, U) = e(h1, σ1)−1 · e(
L∏
i=1
h2i+M [i], σ2)
−1 ·
e(
L∏
i=1
h2L+2i+M [i], σ3)
−1 · e(h4L+2, Ω1)−1 · e(h4L+3, Ω2)−1 .
We will rely on a non-standard security property of this signature scheme. Specifically, we
implicitly prove that no PPT adversary having access to a signing oracle can output a group
element X = gx, for some x ∈ Zp, along with a tuple (σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) which forms a valid
signature with respect to the modified public key
PK =
(
f, g, h, u1, u2, Ω
x
1 = u
ω1·x
1 , Ω
x
2 = u
ω2·x
2 , V , W , pkhsps, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+2j=1
)
. (4)
Unfortunately, our QA-NIZK proof system of Section 3 cannot rely on this property in a modular
way since, in the CRS, the matrix (2) will be mixed with other linear subspaces. We will thus
implicitly prove this property “from scratch” in our proof of simulation-soundness. Under the DLIN
assumption, we show that the adversary would be able to predict the value of a random function
on a non-trivial input if it were able to contradict this property.
3 Constant-Size QA-NIZK Proofs of Linear Subspace Membership with Tight
Simulation-Soundness
At a high level, our proof system can be seen as a variant of the construction of Libert et al. [48]
with several modifications allowing to tightly relate the simulation-soundness property to the DLIN
assumption. The construction also uses the signature scheme of [49] which is recalled in Section 2.4.
3.1 Intuition
Like [48], we combine linearly homomorphic signatures and Groth-Sahai proofs for pairing product
equations. Each QA-NIZK proof consists of a Groth-Sahai NIWI proof of knowledge of a homomor-
phic signature on the candidate vector6 v. By making sure that all simulated proofs take place on a
perfectly WI CRS, the simulator is guaranteed to leak little information about its simulation trap-
door, which is the private key of the homomorphic signature. At the same time, if the adversary’s
proof involves a perfectly binding CRS, the reduction can extract a homomorphic signature that it
6 At first, tight simulation-soundness may seem achievable via an OR proof showing the knowledge of either a
homomorphic signature on v or a digital signature on the verification key of a one-time signature. However,
proving that a disjunction of pairing product equations [34] is satisfiable requires a proof length proportional to
the number of pairings (which is linear in the dimension n here) in pairing product equations.
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would have been unable to compute and solve a DLIN instance. To implement this approach, the
system of [48] uses Waters’ partitioning technique [61] in the fashion of [52], which inevitably [38]
affects the concrete security by a factor proportional to the number q of queries.
Our first main modification is that we let the prover compute the Groth-Sahai NIWI proof on a
CRS F of his own and append a proof piF that the chosen CRS is perfectly binding, which amounts
to proving the membership of a two-dimensional linear subspace span〈f1,f2〉. At first, it appears
that piF has to be simulation-sound itself since, in all simulated proofs, the reduction must trick the
adversary into believing that the ephemeral CRS F is perfectly sound. Fortunately, the reduction
only needs to do this for vectors of its choice —rather than adversarially chosen vectors— and
this scenario can be accommodated by appropriately mixing the subspace of Groth-Sahai vectors
f1,f2 ∈ G3 with the one in the public key of the signature scheme recalled in Section 2.4.
The NIWI proof of knowledge is thus generated for a Groth-Sahai CRS F = (f1,f2,F ) where
f1 and f2 are part of the global CRS but F ∈ G3 is chosen by the prover and included in the
proof. To prove that F is a perfectly sound CRS, honest provers derive a homomorphic signature
(Z,R,U) from the first 4L + 2 rows of a matrix M ∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6) defined by the public key
of the signature scheme and fixed vectors f1,f2,f0 ∈ G3. The first two rows allow deriving a
signature on the honestly generated vector F = fµ11 · fµ22 from publicly available homomorphic
signatures on f1 and f2. The next 4L rows are used to demonstrate the validity of a pseudo-
signature (σ1, σ2, σ3) = (H(V ,VK)
r ·H(W ,VK)s, f r, hs) on the verification key VK of a one-time
signature. This allows the prover to derive a homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) that authenticates
a specific vector σ ∈ G(4L+6) determined by F and the pseudo-signature (σ1, σ2, σ3).
The proof of simulation-soundness uses a strategy where, with high probability, all simulated
proofs will take place on a perfectly NIWI CRS F = (f1,f2,F ) – where F ∈ G3 is linearly
independent of (f1,f2) – whereas the adversary’s fake proof pi
? will contain a vector F ? ∈ G3 such
that F = (f1,f2,F
?) is an extractable CRS (namely, F ? ∈ span〈f1,f2〉). In order to satisfy the
above conditions, the key idea is to have each QA-NIZK proof demonstrate that either: (i) The
vector F contained in pi satisfies F ∈ span〈f1,f2〉; (ii) (σ1, σ2, σ3) is a real signature rather than
a pseudo-signature. Since F ∈ G3 is chosen by the simulator, we are able to prove this compound
statement without resorting to quadratic equations, by appropriately mixing linear subspaces. In
more details, using a perfectly NIWI CRS in all simulated proofs requires the reduction to introduce
a dependency on the fixed f0 ∈ G3 in the vector F which is included in the proof pi. In turn, in
order to obtain a valid homomorphic signature on the vector σ ∈ G(4L+6) determined by F and
(σ1, σ2, σ3), this forces the simulator to use the last row of the matrix M which contains the vector
f0 ∈ G3 and the public key components Ω1, Ω2 of the signature scheme recalled in Section 2.4. To
satisfy the verification algorithm, the vector σ must contain 1G in the coordinates where Ω1, Ω2 are
located in the last row of M. In order to retain these 1G’s at these places, the simulator must use
two other rows of M to cancel out the introduction of Ω1, Ω2 in σ. Applying such a “correction”
implies the capability of replacing the pseudo-signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) by a pair (σ,X = g
x),
where σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) is a real signature for a possibly modified key of the form (4).
In order to obtain a perfectly NIZK proof system, we need to unconditionally hide the actual
subspace where σ ∈ G(4L+6) lives as well as the fact that (σ1, σ2, σ3) is a real signature in simulated
proofs. To this end, we refrain from letting (σ1, Z,R, U) appear in the clear and replace them by
perfectly hiding commitmentsCσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU to the same values and a NIWI proof that (Z,R,U)
is a valid homomorphic signature on the partially committed vector σ. Using our technique, we
only need to prove linear pairing product equations.
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In a construction of nearly tightly CCA2-secure cryptosystem, Libert et al. [49] used a somewhat
similar approach based on pseudo-signatures and consisting of hiding the subspace where a partially
committed vector is chosen. However, besides falling short of providing constant-size QA-NIZK
proofs of subspace membership, the approach of [49] requires quadratic equations and is thus
relatively inefficient. In contrast, while we also relying on pseudo-signatures, our technique for
compactly hiding the underlying linear span completely avoids quadratic equations. It further
yields simulation-sound QA-NIZK arguments that is constant size fitting within 42 group elements,
no matter how large the dimensions of the subspace are.
3.2 Construction
For simplicity, the description below assumes symmetric pairings e : G × G → GT . However, as
explained in Appendix H, instantiations in asymmetric pairings e : G× Gˆ→ GT (with G 6= Gˆ) are
possible under a natural asymmetric analogue of the DLIN assumption. We leave it as an interesting
open problem to build an even more efficient scheme under the Symmetric eXternal Diffie-Hellman
assumption.
As in [41], we assume that the language parameter ρ is a matrix in Gt×n, for some integers
t, n ∈ poly(λ) such that t < n, with an underlying witness relation Rpar such that, for any A ∈ Zt×np
and ρ ∈ Gt×n, Rpar(A,ρ) = 1 if and only if ρ = gA. We consider distributions DΓ ⊂ Gt×n that are
efficiently witness-samplable: namely, there is a PPT algorithm which outputs a pair (ρ,A) such
that Rpar(A,ρ) = 1 and describing a relation Rρ with its associated language Lρ according to DΓ .
For example, the sampling algorithm could pick a random matrix A
R← Zt×np and define ρ = gA.
K0(λ): choose symmetric bilinear groups (G,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ with f, g, h
R← G. Choose a
strongly unforgeable one-time signature Σ = (G,S,V) with verification keys consisting of L-bit
strings, for a suitable L ∈ poly(λ). Then, output Γ = (G,GT , f, g, h,Σ).
The dimensions (t, n) of the matrix A ∈ Zt×np such that ρ = gA can be part of the language, so
that t, n can be given as input to algorithm K1.
K1(Γ,ρ): parse Γ as (G,GT , f, g, h,Σ) and ρ as ρ =
(
Gi,j
)
1≤i≤t, 1≤j≤n ∈ Gt×n.
1. Generate key pairs {(skb, pkb)}1b=0 for the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Sec-
tion 2.3 in order to sign vectors of Gn and G4L+6, respectively. Namely, choose generators
gz, gr, hz, hu
R← G, Gz, Gr, Hz, Hu R← G. Then, for i = 1 to n, pick χi, γi, δi R← Zp and com-
pute gi = gz
χigr
γi and hi = hz
χihu
δi . Let sk0 = {χi, γi, δi}ni=1 be the private key and let
pk0 =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {gi, hi}ni=1
)
be the public key. The second LHSPS key pair (sk1, pk1) is
generated analogously as sk1 = {ϕi, φi, ϑi}4L+6i=1 and
pk1 =
(
Gz, Gr, Hz, Hu, {Gi = Gϕiz Gφir , Hi = Hϕiz Hϑiu }4L+6i=1
)
.
2. Choose y1, y2, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3
R← Zp and compute f1 = gy1 , f2 = gy2 . Define vectors f1 = (f1, 1G, g),
f2 = (1G, f2, g) and f3 = f1
ξ1 ·f2ξ2 · ι(g)ξ3 , where ι(g) = (1G, 1G, g). Define the Groth-Sahai
CRS f = (f1,f2,f3). Then, define yet another vector f0 = f1
ν1 · f2ν2 , with ν1, ν2 R← Zp.
3. For ` = 1 to L, choose V`,0, V`,1,W`,0,W`,1
R← G and define row vectors
V = (V1,0, V1,1, . . . , VL,0, VL,1) ∈ G2L , W = (W1,0,W1,1, . . . ,WL,0,WL,1) ∈ G2L .
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4. Choose n ω1, ω2
R← Zp andn u1, u2 R← G, and compute Ω1 = uω11 ∈ G, Ω2 = uω22 ∈ G.
5. Define the matrix M =
(
Mi,j
)
i,j
∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6) as
(
Mi,j
)
i,j
=

1 11×2L 11×2L 1 1 f1
1 11×2L 11×2L 1 1 f2
V > Idf,2L 12L×2L 12L×1 12L×1 12L×3
W> 12L×2L Idh,2L 12L×1 12L×1 12L×3
g 11×2L 11×2L u1 1 1
1×3
g 11×2L 11×2L 1 u2 1
1×3
1 11×2L 11×2L Ω−11 Ω
−1
2 f0

(5)
with Idf,2L = f
I2L ∈ G2L×2L, Idh,2L = hI2L ∈ G2L×2L, and where I2L ∈ Z2L×2Lp stands for
the identity matrix. Note that the last row allows linking f0 and Ω1, Ω2.
6. Use the LHSPS private key sk0 to generate one-time homomorphic signatures {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1
on the vectors (Gi1, . . . , Gin) ∈ Gn that form the rows of ρ ∈ Gt×n. These are given by triples
(zi, ri, ui) =
(∏n
j=1G
−χj
i,j ,
∏n
j=1G
−γj
i,j ,
∏n
j=1G
−δj
i,j
)
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Likewise, use sk1
to sign the rows Mj = (Mj,1, . . . ,Mj,4L+6) of the matrix (5) and obtain signatures
(Zj , Rj , Uj) =
( 4L+6∏
k=1
M−ϕkj,k ,
4L+6∏
k=1
M−φkj,k ,
4L+6∏
k=1
M−ϑkj,k
)
j ∈ {1, . . . , 4L+ 5}.
7. The CRS ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) consists of two parts which are defined as
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f , f0, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W , pk0, pk1, {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, pk0, pk1, Ω1, Ω2, V , W
)
,
while the simulation trapdoor is τsim =
(
ω1, ω2, {χi, γi, δi}ni=1
)
.
P(Γ, ψ,v, x, lbl): given v ∈ Gn and a witness x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Ztp such that v = gx·A, generate a
one-time signature key pair (VK, SK)← G(λ).
1. Using {(zj , rj , uj)}tj=1, derive a one-time linearly homomorphic signature (z, r, u) on the
vector v with respect to pk0. Namely, compute z =
∏t
i=1 z
xi
i , r =
∏t
i=1 r
xi
i and u =
∏t
i=1 u
xi
i .
2. Choose a vector F = (F1, F2, F3) = f
µ1
1 · fµ22 , for random µ1, µ2 R← Zp.
3. Pick r, s
R← Zp and compute a pseudo-signature on VK = VK[1] . . .VK[L], which is obtained
as (σ1, σ2, σ3) = (H(V ,VK)
r · H(W ,VK)s, f r, hs), where H(V ,VK) = ∏L`=1 V`,VK[`] and
H(W ,VK) =
∏L
`=1W`,VK[`].
4. Derive a one-time linearly homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) ∈ G3 for pk1 on the vector
σ = (σ1, σ
1−VK[1]
2 , σ
VK[1]
2 , . . . , σ
1−VK[L]
2 , σ
VK[L]
2 , σ
1−VK[1]
3 ,
σ
VK[1]
3 , . . . , σ
1−VK[L]
3 , σ
VK[L]
3 , 1G, 1G, F1, F2, F3) ∈ G4L+6 (6)
which belongs to subspace spanned by the first 4L+2 rows of the matrix M ∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6).
Hence, the coefficients r, s, µ1, µ2 ∈ Zp allow deriving a homomorphic signature (Z,R,U)
on σ in (6). Note that the (4L + 2)-th and the (4L + 3)-th coordinates of σ must both
equal 1G.
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5. Using the CRS f = (f1,f2,f3), generate Groth-Sahai commitments Cσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU ∈ G3.
Then, compute NIWI proofs piσ,1,piσ,2 ∈ G3 that committed variables (σ1, Z,R, U) satisfy
e(Z,Gz) · e(R,Gr) · e(σ1, G1) = tG , e(Z,Hz) · e(U,Hu) · e(σ1, H1) = tH , (7)
where
tG = e(σ2,
L∏
i=1
G2i+VK[i])
−1 · e(σ3,
L∏
i=1
G2L+2i+VK[i])
−1 ·
3∏
i=1
e(Fi, G4L+3+i)
−1
and
tH = e(σ2,
L∏
i=1
H2i+VK[i])
−1 · e(σ3,
L∏
i=1
H2L+2i+VK[i])
−1 ·
3∏
i=1
e(Fi, H4L+3+i)
−1 .
6. Using the vector F = (F1, F2, F3) of Step 2, define a new Groth-Sahai CRS F = (f1,f2,F )
and use it to compute commitments
Cz = ι(z) · f θz,11 · f θz,22 · F θz,3 , Cr = ι(r) · f θr,11 · f θr,22 · F θr,3 ,
Cu = ι(u) · f θu,11 · f θu,22 · F θu,3
to the components of (z, r, u) along with NIWI proofs (pi1,pi2) ∈ G6 that v and (z, r, u)
satisfy (1). Let (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) ∈ G15 be the resulting commitments and proofs.
7. Set σ = S(SK, (v,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu,piσ,1,piσ,2,pi1,pi2, lbl)) and out-
put
pi =
(
VK,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu,piσ,1,piσ,2,pi1,pi2, σ
)
. (8)
V(Γ, ψ,v, pi, lbl): parse pi as in (8) and v as (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Gn. Return 1 if the conditions hereunder
all hold. Otherwise, return 0.
(i) V(VK, (v,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu,piσ,1,piσ,2,pi1,pi2, lbl), σ) = 1;
(ii) piσ,1,piσ,2 are valid proofs that the variables (σ1, Z,R, U), which are contained in commit-
ments Cσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU , satisfy equations (7).
(iii) The tuple (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2) forms a valid a valid NIWI proof for the Groth-Sahai CRS
F = (f1,f2,F ). Namely, pi1 = (pi1,1, pi1,2, pi1,3) and pi2 = (pi2,1, pi2,2, pi2,3) satisfy
n∏
i=1
E
(
gi, ι(vi)
)−1
= E
(
gz,Cz
) · E(gr,Cr) · E(pi1,1,f1) · E(pi1,2,f2) · E(pi1,3,F )
n∏
i=1
E
(
hi, ι(vi)
)−1
= E
(
hz,Cz
) · E(hu,Cu) · E(pi2,1,f1) · E(pi2,2,f2) · E(pi2,3,F ) . (9)
The proof only requires 38 elements of G and a pair (VK, σ). In instantiations using the one-time
signature of [37], its total size amounts to 42 group elements, which only lengthens the QA-NIZK
proofs of [48] by a factor of 2.
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4 Security
To avoid unnecessarily overloading notations, we will prove our results in the single CRS setting.
At the main steps, we will explain how the proof can be adapted to the multi-CRS setting without
affecting the tightness of reductions.
Theorem 1. The above proof system is perfectly quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge.
Proof (sketch). We describe the QA-NIZK simulator here but we refer to Appendix C for a detailed
proof that the simulation is perfect. This simulator (S1,S2) is defined by having S1 generate the CRS
ψ as in the real K0 algorithm but retain the simulation trapdoor τsim =
(
ω1, ω2, {χi, γi, δi}ni=1
)
for
later use. As for S2, it generates a simulated proof for v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Gn by using {(χi, γi, δi)}ni=1
to compute (z, r, u) =
(∏n
j=1 v
−χj
j ,
∏n
j=1 v
−γj
j ,
∏n
j=1 v
−δj
j ) at the first step of the simulation instead
of using the actual witness x ∈ Ztp as in the real proving algorithm P. At step 2, it defines the vector
(F1, F2, F3) = f0 · fµ11 · fµ22 with µ1, µ2 R← Zp. At step 3, it randomly picks r, s R← Zp to compute
a triple (σ1, σ2, σ3) =
(
gω1+ω2 · H(V ,VK)r · H(W ,VK)s, f r, hs) before using the coefficients
µ1, µ2, r, s, ω1, ω2, 1 ∈ Zp to derive a homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) from {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 at
step 4. Steps 5 to 7 are conducted as in the real P.
In Appendix C, we prove that the simulation is perfect in that the simulated CRS ψ is distributed
as a real CRS and, for all v ∈ Gn for which there exists x ∈ Ztp such that v = gx·A, simulated
proofs are distributed as real proofs. uunionsq
We now prove that the system remains computationally sound and simulation-sound, even when
the adversary is given the matrix A = logg(ρ) ∈ Zt×np , which allows recognizing elements of Lρ.
Although the enhanced soundness property is implied by that of enhanced simulation-soundness,
we prove it separately in Theorem 2 since the reduction can be made optimal.
Theorem 2. The system provides quasi-adaptive soundness under the DLIN assumption. Any en-
hanced soundness adversary A with running time tA implies a DLIN distinguisher B with running
time tB ≤ tA + q · poly(λ, L, t, n) and such that Adve-soundA (λ) ≤ 2 ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 2/p. (The proof
is in Appendix D.)
Theorem 3. The above system provides quasi-adaptive unbounded simulation-soundness if: (i) Σ
is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature; (ii) The DLIN assumption holds. For any enhanced
unbounded simulation-soundness adversary A, there exist a one-time signature forger B′ in the
multi-key setting and a DLIN distinguisher B with running times tB, tB′ ≤ tA + q · poly(λ, L, t, n)
such that
Adve-ussA (λ) ≤ Advq-suf-otsB′ (λ) + 3 · (L+ 2) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 4/p , (10)
where L is the verification key length of Σ and q is the number of simulations.
Proof. To prove the result, we consider a sequence of games. In Gamei, we denote by Si the event
that the challenger outputs 1.
Game1: This game is the actual attack. Namely, the adversary A receives as input the description
of the language Lρ and has access to a simulated CRS ψ and the simulated prover S2(ψ, τsim, ., .)
which is described in the proof of Theorem 1. At each invocation, S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) inputs a vector-
label pair (v, lbl) and outputs a simulated proof pi that v ∈ Lρ. In order a generate the matrix
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ρ ∈ Gt×n with the appropriate distribution DΓ , the challenger chooses a matrix A ∈ Zt×np
with the suitable distribution (which is possible since DΓ is efficiently witness-samplable) and
computes ρ = gA. Also, the challenger B computes a basis W ∈ Zn×(n−t)p of the nullspace of A.
The adversary receives as input the simulated CRS ψ and the matrix A ∈ Zt×np , which serves
as a membership testing trapdoor τm, and queries the simulator S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) on a polynomial
number of occasions. When the adversary A halts, it outputs an element v?, a proof pi? and a
label lbl?. The adversary is declared successful and the challenger outputs 1 if and only if (pi?, lbl?)
is a verifying proof but v? 6∈ Lρ (i.e., v? is linearly independent of the rows of ρ ∈ Gt×n) and
(pi?, lbl?) was not trivially obtained from the simulator. We call S1 the latter event, which is easily
recognizable by the challenger B since the latter knows a basis W ∈ Zn×(n−t)p of the right kernel
of A. Indeed, W allows testing if v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Gn satisfies
∏n
j=1 v
wji
j = 1G for each column
w>i = (w1i, . . . , wni)
> of W. By definition, the adversary’s advantage is Adv(A) := Pr[S1].
Game2: We modify the generation of the CRS ψ = (CRS1,CRS2). Instead of choosing f3 ∈R G3
as a uniformly random vector, S1 sets f3 = f
ξ1
1 · f ξ22 , for random ξ1, ξ2 R← Zp. Hence, f1,f2
and f3 now underlie a subspace of dimension 2 and f = (f1,f2,f3) thus becomes a perfectly
binding CRS. Under the DLIN assumption, this modification should have no noticeable impact
on A’s probability of success. We have |Pr[S2]− Pr[S1]| ≤ AdvDLIN(B).
Game3: We modify again the generation of ψ. Now, instead of choosing f0 in span〈f1,f2〉, S1 sets
f0 = f
ν1
1 · fν22 · ι(g), for random ν1, ν2 R← Z∗p. The vector f0 is now linearly independent of
(f1,f2). Under the DLIN assumption, this modification will remain unnoticed to the adversary.
In particular, A’s winning probability should only change by a negligible amount. A two-step
reduction from DLIN shows that |Pr[S3]− Pr[S2]| ≤ 2 ·AdvDLIN(B).
Game4: This game is like Game3 but B halts and outputs a random bit if A outputs a proof pi?
containing a one-time verification key VK? that is recycled from an output of the S2(ψ, τsim, ., .)
oracle. Game4 and Game3 proceed identically until the latter event occurs. This event further
contradicts the strong unforgeability of Σ. If Σ has tight multi-key security7 (in the sense
of [37]), the probability of this event can be bounded independently of the number q of queries
to S2(ψ, τsim, ., .). We have |Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ Advq-suf-otsB (λ).
Game5: This game is identical to Game4 but we raise a failure event E5. When A outputs its fake
proof pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
, B parses the
vector F ? as (F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) ∈ G3 and uses the extraction trapdoor (y1, y2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2))
of the Groth-Sahai CRS f = (f1,f2,f3) to test if the equality F
?
3 6= F ?1 1/y1 · F ?2 1/y2 holds,
meaning that F? = (f1,f2,F
?) is not a perfectly binding Groth-Sahai CRS. We denote by
E5 the latter event, which causes B to abort and output a random bit if it occurs. Clearly,
Game5 is identical to Game4 unless E5 occurs, so that |Pr[S5] − Pr[S4]| ≤ Pr[E5]. Lemma 1
demonstrates that event E5 occurs with negligible probability if the DLIN assumption holds.
More precisely, the probability Pr[E5] is at most Pr[E5] ≤ (2 ·L+ 1) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 2/p, where
B is a DLIN distinguisher whose computational complexity only exceeds that of A by the cost
of a polynomial number of exponentiations in G and a constant number of pairing evaluations.
7 This notion (see Definition 4 in [37]) is defined via a game where the adversary is given q verification keys {VKi}qi=1
and an oracle that returns exactly one signature for each key. The adversary’s tasks is to output a triple (i?,M?, σ?),
where i? ∈ {1, . . . , q} and (M?, σ?) was not produced by the signing oracle for VKi? . Hofheinz and Jager [37, Section
4.2] gave a discrete-log-based one-time signature with tight security in the multi-key setting.
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In Game5, we have Pr[S5] = Pr[S5 ∧ E5] + Pr[S5 ∧ ¬E5] = 12 · Pr[E5] + Pr[S5 ∧ ¬E5], so that the
probability of event S5 is at most Pr[S5] ≤ (L+ 1) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 1p + Pr[S5 ∧ ¬E5].
In Game5, we show that event S5 ∧ ¬E5 implies an algorithm B solving a given SDP instance
(gz, gr, hz, hu), which also contradicts the DLIN assumption.
Assuming that event S5∧¬E5 indeed occurs, we know that the adversary A manages to output
a correct proof pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
for a
vector v? = (v?1, . . . , v
?
n) outside the row space of ρ = g
A and such that F ? = (F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) is a
BBS encryption of 1G (namely, F
?
3 = F
?
1
1/y1 · F ?2 1/y1). This means that, although the simulated
proofs produced by S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) were all generated for a perfectly NIWI Groth-Sahai CRS F =
(f1,f2,F ), the last part (C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
1,pi
?
2) ofA’s proof pi? takes place on a perfectly binding CRS
F? = (f1,f2,F
?). Moreover, although B does not know µ?1, µ?2 ∈ Zp such that F ? = f1µ
?
1 · f2µ?2 , B
can still use the extraction trapdoor (y1, y2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2)) to recover (z
?, r?, u?) from their
commitments (C?z,C
?
r ,C
?
u) by performing BBS decryptions. Indeed,C
?
z = ι(z
?)·f1θz,1 ·f2θz,2 ·F ?θz,3
is of the form C?z = ι(z
?) · f1θz,1+µ?1·θz,3 · f2θz,2+µ?2·θz,3 , which decrypts to z?.
The perfect soundness of the Groth-Sahai CRS F? = (f1,f2,F
?) ensures that extracted group
elements (z?, r?, u?) satisfy the pairing product equations
e(gz, z
?) · e(gr, r?) ·
∏
i=1
e(gi, v
?
i ) = e(hz, z
?) · e(hu, u?) ·
∏
i=1
e(hi, v
?
i ) = 1GT . (11)
In addition, B computes (z†, r†, u†) = (∏ni=1 v?i −χi ,∏ni=1 v?i −γi ,∏ni=1 v?i −δi), which also satisfies the
equations (11). Since (z†, r†, u†) and (z?, r?, u?) both satisfy (11), the triple (z‡, r‡, u‡) =
(
z?
z† ,
r?
r† ,
u?
u†
)
necessarily satisfies the equalities e(gz, z
‡) · e(gr, r‡) = e(hz, z‡) · e(hu, u‡) = 1GT . We argue that
z‡ 6= 1G with probability 1− 1/p, so that (z‡, r‡, u‡) breaks the SDP assumption.
To see this, we remark that, if event S5 ∧ ¬E5 actually happens, B never reveals any infor-
mation about (χ1, . . . , χn) when it emulates S2(ψ, τsim, ., .). Indeed, in simulated proofs, the only
components that depend on (χ1, . . . , χn) are (Cz,Cr,Cu,pi1,pi2), which are generated for a per-
fectly NIWI Groth-Sahai CRS (f1,f2,F ). Consequently, the same arguments as in [47, Theorem
1] show that z† 6= z? with probability 1− 1/p. In the CRS, {(gi, hi)}ni=1 and {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1 provide
A with a linear system of 2n + t < 3n equations in 3n unknowns {(χi, γi, δi)}ni=1, which leaves
z† completely undetermined in A’s view if v? is linearly independent of the rows of ρ = (Gi,j)i,j .
We thus find the inequality Pr[S5 ∧ ¬E5] ≤ AdvSDPB (λ) + 1/p, which yields the bound (10) since
AdvSDPB (λ) ≤ 12 ·AdvDLINB (λ) if we translate the SDP solver B into a DLIN distinguisher. uunionsq
The result easily extends to the multi-CRS setting via the following changes. In the transitions
from Game1 to Game2 and Game2 to Game3, we can simultaneously modify all CRSes {ψ(κ)}µκ=1
by using the random self-reducibility of DLIN to build µ instances of the DLIN assumption from
a given instance. In Game5, the probability Pr[E5] can be bounded by implicitly relying on the
multi-user security (in the sense of [31]) of the signature scheme recalled in Section 2.4, which
remains almost tight in the multi-key setting. In the proof of the following lemma, we will explain
at each step how the proof can be adapted to the multi-CRS setting. Finally, the probability of
event S5 ∧ ¬E5 in Game5 can be proved by applying the same arguments as in the proof (see [49,
Appendix G]) that the signature scheme of Section 2.4 provides tight security in the multi-user
setting.
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Lemma 1. In Game5, there is a DLIN distinguisher B such that the probability of event E5 is at
most Pr[E5] ≤ (2 ·L+ 1) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 2/p. Moreover, B’s complexity only exceeds that of A by a
polynomial number of exponentiations and a constant number of pairing computations. (The proof
is in Appendix E.)
5 Applications to Tightly Secure Primitives
As an application of our QA-NIZK proof system, we present a new encryption scheme whose
IND-CCA2 security in the multi-challenge-multi-user setting (almost) tightly relates to the DLIN
assumption. We show that the resulting construction allows improving the expansion rate of non-
interactive universally composable commitments based on IND-CCA2-secure public-key encryption.
5.1 CCA2-Secure (Threshold) Public-Key Encryption with Shorter Ciphertexts
Like [37,49], our scheme builds on the Naor-Yung paradigm [55] and the encryption scheme of
Boneh, Boyen and Shacham (BBS) [15].
In short, the encryption phase computes BBS ciphertexts (C0, C1, C2) = (M · gθ1+θ2 , Xθ11 , Y θ21 )
and (D0, D1, D3) = (M · gθ3+θ4 , Xθ32 , Y θ42 ), where (X1, Y1, X2, Y2) are part of the public key, and
generates a QA-NIZK proof pi that the vector
v =
(
C1/D1, C2/D2, C0/D0, C1 · C2, D−11 ·D−12
) ∈ G5
=
(
Xθ11 ·X−θ32 , Y θ21 · Y −θ42 , g(θ1+θ2)−(θ3+θ4), Xθ11 · Y θ21 , X−θ32 · Y −θ42
)
is in the subspace spanned by X1 = (X1, 1, g,X1, 1), Y 1 = (1, Y1, g, Y1, 1), X2 = (X2, 1, g, 1, X2)
and Y 2 = (1, X2, g, 1, X2). As in [49], our reduction is not quite as tight as in [37,4] since a factor
Θ(λ) is lost. On the other hand, our scheme becomes nearly practical as the ciphertext overhead
now decreases to 48 group elements. In comparison, the solution of Libert et al. [49] incurs 69 group
elements per ciphertext. Our technique thus improves upon [49] by 30% and also outperforms the
most efficient perfectly tight solution [4], which entails over 300 group elements per ciphertext.
The CRS of the proof system is included in the user’s public key rather than in the common
public parameters since, in the QA-NIZK setting, it depends on the considered language which is
defined by certain public key components.
Par-Gen(λ): Run the K0 algorithm of Section 3 in order to obtain common public parameters
Γ =
(
(G,GT ), f, g, h,Σ
)
.
Keygen(Γ ): Parse Γ as
(
(G,GT ), f, g, h,Σ
)
and conduct the following steps.
1. Choose random exponents x1, x2, y1, y2
R← Zp and define X1 = gx1 , X2 = gx2 , Y1 = gy1 ,
Y2 = g
y2 . Then, define the independent vectors X1 = (X1, 1, g,X1, 1), Y 1 = (1, Y1, g, Y1, 1),
X2 = (X2, 1, g, 1, X2) and Y 2 = (1, X2, g, 1, X2).
2. Run algorithm K1(Γ,ρ) of Section 3 to generate the language-dependent part of the CRS
for the proof system, where the rows of the matrix ρ ∈ G4×5 consist of X1, Y 1, X2 and
Y 2. Let ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) be the obtained CRS, where
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f ,f0, {ui}2i=1, {Ωi}2i=1,V ,W , {pki}2i=1, {(zi, ri, ui)}4i=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, {pki}2i=1, {Ωi}2i=1, V , W
)
.
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3. Define the private key as the pair SK = (x1, y1) ∈ Z4p. The public key is defined to be
PK =
(
g, X1, Y 1, X2, Y 2, ψ = (CRS1,CRS2)
)
.
Encrypt(M,PK): to encrypt M ∈ G, conduct the following steps.
1. Pick random exponents θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4
R← Zp and compute (C0, C1, C2) = (M ·gθ1+θ2 , Xθ11 , Y θ21 )
as well as (D0, D1, D3) = (M · gθ3+θ4 , Xθ32 , Y θ42 ).
2. Define lbl = (C0, C1, C2, D0, D1, D2). Using the witness x = (θ1, θ2,−θ3,−θ4) ∈ Z4p and the
label lbl, run Steps 1-7 of Algorithm P in Section 3 to generate a proof pi that the vector
v =
(
C1/D1, C2/D2, C0/D0, C1 · C2, D−11 ·D−12
) ∈ G5
=
(
Xθ11 ·X−θ32 , Y θ21 · Y −θ42 , g(θ1+θ2)−(θ3+θ4), Xθ11 · Y θ21 , X−θ32 · Y −θ42
)
belongs to span〈X1,Y 1,X2,Y 2〉. The simulation-sound QA-NIZK proof is
pi =
(
VK,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu,piσ,1,piσ,2,pi1,pi2, σ
)
.
3. Output the ciphertext C = (C0, C1, C2, D0, D1, D2, pi).
Decrypt(SK,C): given C = (C0, C1, C2, D0, D1, D2, pi), do the following.
1. Run the verification algorithm V of Section 3 on input of lbl = (C0, C1, C2, D0, D1, D2), the
vector v =
(
C1/D1, C2/D2, C0/D0, C1 · C2, D−11 ·D−12
)
and pi. Return ⊥ if pi is not a valid
proof for the label lbl that v is in span〈X1,Y 1,X2,Y 2〉.
2. Using SK = (x1, y1) ∈ Z2p, compute and return M = C0 · C−1/x11 · C−1/y12 .
Using our proof system of Section 3 and the one-time signature of [37], the ciphertext size
amounts to that of 48 group elements, instead of 69 in [49].
While our construction is described in terms of symmetric pairings in order to lighten notations
as much as possible, it readily extends to asymmetric pairings, as explained in Appendix H.
Theorem 4. The scheme is (1, qe)-IND-CCA secure provided: (i) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-
time signature; (ii) The DLIN assumption holds in G. For any adversary A, there exist a one-time
signature forger B′ and a DLIN distinguisher B with running times tB, tB′ ≤ tA + qe · poly(λ, L)
such that
Adv
(1,qe)-cca
A (λ) ≤ Advqe-suf-otsB′ (λ) + (3L+ 10) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 8/p ,
where L is the length of one-time verification keys and qe is the number of encryption queries. (The
proof is in Appendix F.)
The result of Theorem 4 carries over to a scenario involving µ > 1 public keys modulo an
additional negligible term µ/p in the bound which is inherited from [37, Theorem 6]. This is achieved
by relying on the enhanced USS property of the QA-NIZK proof system in the multi-CRS setting.
Similarly to previous IND-CCA2-secure encryption schemes based on the Naor-Yung paradigm
(e.g., [30]), the public verifiability of ciphertexts makes our scheme amenable for non-interactive
threshold decryption in a static corruption model. Like many other pairing-based CCA2-secure
threshold cryptosystems (e.g., [16,46,5]), the resulting scheme can be made robust against malicious
adversaries in a simple manner, by leveraging the verifiability properties enabed by bilinear groups.
By instantiating the construction of Camenisch et al. [19] with our QA-NIZK proofs, we similarly
obtain more efficient KDM-CCA2-secure systems with tight security, as explained in Appendix G.
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5.2 Encrypting Long Messages
In some applications, it is useful to encrypt long messages while preserving the feasibility of ef-
ficiently proving statements about encrypted values using Groth-Sahai proofs. In this case, the
amortized efficiency of our system can be significantly improved. Suppose that we want to encrypt
messages (M1, . . . ,MN ) ∈ GN . The technique of Bellare et al. [8] allows doing so while making
optimal use of encryption exponents. In more details, the public key consists of group elements(
g, h, {(Xi,1, Yi,1, Xi,2, Yi,2)}Ni=1
)
, with (Xi,1, Yi,1, Xi,2, Yi,2) = (g
xi,1 , hyi,1 , gxi,2 , hyi,2) and the secret
key is {(xi,1, yi,1)}Ni=1. The vector is encrypted by choosing θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4 R← Zp and computing
C0 = f
θ1 , C ′0 = h
θ2 ,
{
Ci = Mi ·Xθ1i,1 · Y θ2i,1
}N
i=1
,
D0 = f
θ3 , D′0 = h
θ4 ,
{
Di = Mi ·Xθ3i,2 · Y θ4i,2
}N
i=1
,
while appending a simulation-sound QA-NIZK argument that the vector
(
C1/D1, . . . , CN/DN ,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
C0, . . . , C0,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
D−10 , . . . , D
−1
0 ,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
C ′0, . . . , C
′
0,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
D′0
−1
, . . . , D′0
−1 ) ∈ G5N
lives in the 4N -dimensional linear subspace span〈Xi,1,Xi,2,Y i,1,Y i,2〉Ni=1, with
Xi,1 = (1
i−1, Xi,1,1N−i,1i−1, f,1N−i,13N ) , Xi,2 = (1i−1, Xi,2,1N−i,1N ,1i−1, f,1N−i,12N ) ,
Y i,1 = (1
i−1, Yi,1,1N−i,12N ,1i−1, h,1N−i,1N ) , Y i,2 = (1i−1, Yi,2,1N−i,13N ,1i−1, h,1N−i) ,
where, for each i ∈ N, 1i stands for the i-dimensional vector (1G, . . . , 1G) ∈ Gi. The entire ciphertext
fits within 2N+46 group elements, of which only 42 elements are consumed by the QA-NIZK proof.
The tight IND-CCA2 security can be proved in the same way as in Theorem 4. In particular, we
rely on the tight IND-CPA security in the multi-challenge setting of a variant of the BBS encryption
scheme where messages M are encrypted8 as (fθ1 , hθ2 ,M ·Xθ1 · Y θ2).
In Appendix 5.3, we explain how the compatibility of this construction with zero-knowledge
proofs comes in handy to build non-interactive and adaptively secure universally composable com-
mitments based on CCA2-secure encryption.
5.3 Application to UC Commitments
Universally composable commitments [26,20] are commitment schemes that provably remain se-
cure when composed with arbitrary other protocols. They are known [20] to require some setup
assumption like a common reference string. In some constructions, the CRS can only be used in a
single commitment. Back in 2001, Canetti and Fischlin [20] gave re-usable bit commitments based
on chosen-ciphertext-secure public-key encryption. In [51], Lindell described a simple and practical
re-usable construction which allows committing to strings rather than individual bits. In short,
each commitment consists of an IND-CCA2-secure encryption. In order to open a commitment
later on, the sender generates an interactive zero-knowledge proof that the ciphertext encrypts
the underlying plaintext. In its basic variant, Lindell’s commitment only provides security against
8 The reduction from the DLIN assumption is straightforward and sets up X = fα · gγ , Y = hβ · gγ . From a
given DLIN instance (f, g, h, fa, hb, η), where η = ga+b or η ∈R G, the challenge ciphertext is computed as
(C1, C2, C3) = (f
a, hb,Mβ · (fa)α · (hb)β · ηγ).
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static adversaries that have to choose whom to corrupt upfront9. Subsequently, Fischlin et al. [29]
showed that Lindell’s commitment can be made adaptively secure in the erasure model by the
simple expedient of opening commitments via a NIZK proof (rather than an interactive one) which
the sender generates at commitment time before erasing his encryption coins. Jutla and Roy [41]
gave an optimization of the latter approach where the use of QA-NIZK proofs allows reducing the
size of commitments and openings.
Using our CCA2-secure encryption scheme for long messages, we can build a tightly secure non-
interactive universally composable commitment [26,20] that allows committing to long messages
with expansion rate 2. Note that, in constructions of UC commitments from IND-CCA2-secure en-
cryption (e.g., [20,29,41]), a multi-challenge definition of IND-CCA2 security is usually considered
in proofs of UC security. In the erasure model, the non-interactive and adaptively secure variants of
Lindell’s commitment [29,41] can be optimized using the techniques of [48,42] to achieve a two-fold
expansion rate. However, these solutions are not known to provide tight security. At the cost of
a CRS of size Θ(N), the labeled version of our encryption scheme for long messages (where the
label L of the ciphertext is simply included in lbl) allows eliminating this limitation. As in [41], the
sender can encrypt the message (M1, . . . ,MN ) he wants to commit to and open the commitment
via a QA-NIZK proof that
(
C1/M1, . . . , CN/MN ,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
C0, . . . , C0,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
C ′0, . . . , C
′
0,
N times︷ ︸︸ ︷
1, . . . , 1
) ∈ G5N
is in span〈Xi,1,Xi,2,Y i,1,Y i,2〉Ni=1. For long messages, this construction thus achieves a two-fold
expansion rate. While not as efficient as the recent rate-1 commitments of Garay et al. [33], it
retains adaptive security assuming reliable erasures while [33] is only known to be secure against
static adversaries.
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A Groth-Sahai Non-Interactive Proof Systems
In the following, vectors are always considered as row vectors unless stated otherwise. For any
generator g ∈ G, we denote by ι(g) ∈ G3 the vector (1G, 1G, g).
In their DLIN-based assumption in symmetric pairings, the Groth-Sahai (GS) proof systems [35]
use a common reference string (CRS) made of vectors f1,f2,f3 ∈ G3, where f1 = (f1, 1, g), f2 =
(1, f2, g) for some f1, f2 ∈ G. A commitment to a group element X ∈ G is obtained by computing
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C = (1, 1, X) ·f1r ·f2s ·f3t with r, s, t R← Zp. In order to have perfectly sound proofs, f3 is chosen as
f3 = f1
ξ1 · f2ξ2 with ξ1, ξ2 R← Zp. In this case, commitments C = (f r+ξ1t1 , fs+ξ2t2 , X · gr+s+t(ξ1+ξ2))
are nothing but Boneh-Boyen-Shacham (BBS) ciphertexts as X can be recovered using the BBS
private key (α1, α2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2)). In order to have perfectly witness indistinguishable (WI)
proofs, f1,f2 and f3 are linearly independent vectors, so that C is a perfectly hiding commitment
to X ∈ G: a typical choice is f3 = f1ξ1 · f2ξ2 · ι(g)−1. Under the DLIN assumption, the two
distributions of CRS are computationally indistinguishable.
In the perfect and computational NIWI settings, efficient proofs are available for pairing-product
equations, which are relations of the type
n∏
i=1
e(Ai,Xi) ·
n∏
i=1
·
n∏
j=1
e(Xi,Xj)aij = tT ,
for variables X1, . . . ,Xn ∈ G and constants tT ∈ GT , A1, . . . ,An ∈ G, aij ∈ Zp, for i, j ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
Non-interactive proofs for linear equations (with aij = 0 for all i, j) only require 3 group elements.
B Definitions for Linearly Homomorphic Structure-Preserving Signatures
Let (G,GT ) be groups of prime order p such that a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT can be efficiently
computed.
A signature scheme is structure-preserving [3,2] if messages, signatures and public keys all
live in the group G. In linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signatures, the message space
M consists of pairs M := T × Gn, for some n ∈ N, where T is a tag space. Depending on the
application, one may want the tags to be group elements or not. In this paper, they can be arbitrary
strings.
Definition 3. A linearly homomorphic structure-preserving signature scheme over (G,GT ) is a
tuple of efficient algorithms Σ = (Keygen,Sign,SignDerive,Verify) for which the message space
consists of M := T × Gn, for some integer n ∈ poly(λ) and some set T , and with the following
specifications.
Keygen(λ, n) is a randomized algorithm that takes in a security parameter λ ∈ N and an integer
n ∈ poly(λ) denoting the dimension of vectors to be signed. It outputs a key pair (pk, sk), where
pk includes the description of a tag space T , where each tag serves as a file identifier.
Sign(sk, τ,M) takes as input a private key sk, a file identifier τ ∈ T and a vector of group elements
M = (M1, . . . ,Mn) ∈ Gn. It outputs a signature σ ∈ Gns, for some ns ∈ poly(λ).
SignDerive(pk, τ, {(ωi, σ(i))}`i=1) is a homomorphic signature derivation algorithm. It inputs a
public key pk, a file identifier τ as well as ` pairs (ωi, σ
(i)), each of which consists of a coefficient
ωi ∈ Zp and a signature σ(i) ∈ Gns. It outputs a signature σ ∈ Gns on the vector M =∏`
i=1M
ωi
i , where σ
(i) is a signature on M i.
Verify(pk, τ,M, σ) is a deterministic verification algorithm that takes as input a public key pk, a
file identifier τ ∈ T , a signature σ and a vector M = (M1, . . . ,Mn). It outputs 0 or 1 depending
on whether σ is deemed valid or not.
In a one-time linearly homomorphic SPS, the tag τ can be omitted in the specification as a
given key pair (pk, sk) only allows signing one linear subspace.
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As in all linearly homomorphic signatures, the desired security notion mandates the adversary’s
inability to come up with a valid triple (τ?,M?, σ?) for a new file identifier τ? or, if τ? appeared in
signatures generated by the signing oracle, for a vector M? outside the linear span of the vectors
that have been legitimately signed for the tag τ?.
C Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. To prove the quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge property, we consider a sequence of three games
which begins with a game where the adversary has access to a real prover P on a real CRS ψ. In
the last game, the adversary interacts with a simulator (S1,S2).
Game1: is a game where the adversary A is given the description of the language Lρ and is granted
access to a real CRS ψ and an actual prover P(ψ, ., .) which takes as input a vector v along with
a witness x ∈ Ztp such that v = gx·A. At each invocation, the oracle outputs a genuine proof
pi by running the legal P algorithm. The adversary is allowed to query P(ψ, ., .) a polynomial
number of times and eventually outputs a bit β ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by S1 the event that β = 1.
Game2: This game like Game2 with the difference that, when the P(ψ, ., .) oracle is queried on a
pair (v,x), the witness x ∈ Ztp is no longer used at step 1 of the proving algorithm. Instead,
P(ψ, ., .) uses the the homomorphic signature’s private key {(χi, γi, δi)}ni=1 to compute a one-
time homomorphic signature (z, r, u) =
(∏n
j=1 v
−χj
j ,
∏n
j=1 v
−γj
j ,
∏n
j=1 v
−δj
j ) on the input vector
v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Gn. All other parts of pi are generated as in the real P(ψ, ., .) oracle in steps
2-7 of the proof generation algorithm. Although, the witness x ∈ Ztp is not used at any time, it
is easy to see that (z, r, u) has exactly the same distribution as in Game1 if v ∈ Lρ (i.e., as long
as there exists x ∈ Ztp such that v = gx·A). We thus have Pr[S2] = Pr[S1].
Game3: In this game, we bring another modification to the P(ψ, ., .) oracle. Namely, steps 2 and
3 are conducted as follows. At step 2, the modified oracle P(ψ, ., .) chooses µ1, µ2
R← Zp and
computes the vector F ∈ G3 as F = (F1, F2, F3) = f0 ·fµ11 ·fµ22 instead of (F1, F2, F3) = fµ11 ·fµ22
as previously. At Step 3, P(ψ, ., .) uses ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp to compute
(σ1, σ2, σ3) =
(
gω1+ω2 ·H(V ,VK)r ·H(W ,VK)s, f r, hs).
Observe that the vector (6) is no longer confined in the row space of the first 4L + 2 rows of
M ∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6) as it now depends on all rows. At step 4 of the simulated P, however,
the simulator can still compute a signature (Z,R,U) on the vector (6) by deriving it from
{(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 via the coefficients µ1, µ2, r, s, ω1, ω2, 1 ∈ Zp. We claim that these changes
do not affect the distribution of proofs pi whatsoever. Indeed, since we have f0 ∈ span〈f1,f2〉,
F remains uniform in span〈f1,f2〉. Although the joint distribution of (σ1, σ2, σ3) has changed,
the adversary only gets to see perfectly hiding Groth-Sahai commitments Cσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU to
(σ1, Z,R, U) and perfectly NIWI proofs piσ,1,piσ,2 ∈ G3, which retain the same distribution
as in Game3 (recall that these are generated for a perfectly witness indistinguishable CRS
(f1,f2,f3)). Hence, even an unbounded adversary is unable to tell if the committed signature
(Z,R,U) authenticates a partially committed vector σ (6) that belongs to the subspace of the
first 4L+ 2 rows of M or the entire row space. It comes that Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
The simulator (S1,S2) lets S1 generate ψ as in Game3 (so that ψ is distributed as the real CRS). As
for S2, it generates proofs without using x ∈ Ztp as in Game3. Specifically, S2 uses {(χi, γi, δi)}ni=1 to
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compute (z, r, u) at the first step of the simulation. At step 2, it defines (F1, F2, F3) = f0 ·fµ11 ·fµ22
with µ1, µ2
R← Zp. At step 3, it randomly picks r, s R← Zp to compute a triple (σ1, σ2, σ3) =(
gω1+ω2 · H(V ,VK)r · H(W ,VK)s, f r, hs) before using the coefficients µ1, µ2, r, s, ω1, ω2, 1 ∈ Zp
to derive (Z,R,U) from {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 at step 4. Steps 5 to 7 are conducted as in the real
algorithm P.
The system is perfectly quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge since the simulated CRS ψ is distributed
as a real CRS and, for all vectors v ∈ Gn in the row space of gA, simulated proofs have exactly the
same distribution as real proofs. uunionsq
D Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The result immediately follows from the unforgeability of the linearly homomorphic signa-
ture recalled in Section 2.3, which was proved in [47, Theorem 1], but we give it for completeness.
We first note that the challenger B can efficiently detect when the adversary wins since it can
generate ρ = gA by first choosing A ∈ Zt×np given that the distribution DΓ is efficiently witness-
samplable. Knowing A, B can thus recognize when the adversary outputs a vector v? 6∈ Lρ. We
first show that, as long as the DLIN assumption holds, if the adversary A can break the enhanced
quasi-adaptive soundness with non-negligible probability in the real attack game, called Game0
hereunder, the same holds in a modified game called Game1.
Game1: It proceeds identically to Game0 except that the Groth-Sahai CRS f = (f1,f2,f3) is now
chosen as a perfectly binding Groth-Sahai CRS, where f3 = f1
ξ1 · f2ξ2 for randomly chosen
ξ1, ξ2
R← Zp, which amounts to setting ξ3 = 0 at step 2 of K1. If A wins with significantly different
probabilities in Game0 and Game1, the challenger can be turned into a DLIN distinguisher. More
precisely, we have the inequality |Pr[A wins Game0]− Pr[A wins Game1]| ≤ AdvDLIN(λ).
In Game1, we build an algorithm B that uses the soundness adversary A to break the security
of the LHSPS system of [47]. At the very beginning of the soundness game, B flips a fair coin
d
R← {0, 1} which will define its strategy depending on whether A’s fake proof pi? is expected
to involve a perfectly hiding (for d = 1) or a perfectly binding (with d = 0) Groth-Sahai CRS
F? = (f1,f2,F
?).
– If d = 0, B decides to interact with a challenger for an instance of the linearly homomor-
phic signature allowing to sign vectors of dimension n. Algorithm B thus receives a LHSPS
public key pk0 =
(
gz, gr, hz, hu, {gi, hi}ni=1
)
from its challenger and uses it to build a CRS
ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) for A. To this end, B first generates ρ ∈ Gt×n by choosing a matrix
A ∈ Zt×np with the appropriate distribution (recall that DΓ is efficiently witness-samplable) and
computes ρ = gA. Having defined ρ, B queries its challenger in order to obtain homomorphic
signatures {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1 on the rows of ρ. Then, B generates the rest of ψ = (CRS1,CRS2)
as in the real K1 algorithm. In particular, B chooses the second LHSPS key pair (sk1, pk1)
itself, which allows it to compute homomorphic signatures {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 on the rows of
M ∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6). At step 2 of K1, B also defines (f1, f2) = (gy1 , gy2) and f0 = f1ν1 · f2ν2 ,
for randomly chosen y1, y2, ν1, ν2
R← Zp, where f1 = (f1, 1, g) and f2 = (1, f2, g). Steps 3-6 are
conducted as in the real algorithm K1 and the adversary is given ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) as well
as the matrix A = logg(ρ) ∈ Zt×np which serves as a trapdoor τm for testing membership of Lρ.
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By hypothesis, A must be able to create a fake proof pi? for a vector v? 6∈ Lρ. At this point, B
parses pi? as
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
and the un-
derlying F ? ∈ G3 as (F ?1 , F ?2 , F ?3 ). Then, B aborts if F ?3 6= F ?1 1/y1 ·F ?2 1/y2 . Otherwise, there exists
ν?1 , ν
?
2 ∈ Zp such that (F ?1 , F ?2 , F ?3 ) = f1ν
?
1 · f2ν?2 , which means that (f1,f2,F ?) is a perfectly
binding Groth-Sahai CRS. In this case, B can use (y1, y2) ∈ Z?p as an extraction trapdoor to
extract (z?, r?, u?) from the Groth-Sahai commitments C?z,C
?
r ,C
?
u and the perfect soundness
of pi?1,pi
?
2 ensures that they satisfy
e(gz, z
?) · e(gr, r?) ·
n∏
i=1
e(gi, v
?
i ) = 1GT ,
e(hz, z
?) · e(hu, r?) ·
n∏
i=1
e(hi, v
?
i ) = 1GT .
Since the vector v? = (v?1, . . . , v
?
n) ∈ Gn is linearly independent of the rows of ρ = gA by
hypothesis, B wins the game against its LHSPS challenger by outputting v? and (z?, r?, u?).
– If d = 1, B interacts with a challenger for an instance of the homomorphic signature allowing to
sign vectors of G4L+6. It receives as input a public key pk1 =
(
Gz, Gr, Hz, Hu, {(Gi, Hi)}4L+6i=1
)
from its LHSPS challenger. Then, it faithfully conducts steps 2-5 of K1 and queries its challenger
in order to obtain homomorphic signatures {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 on the rows of the matrix M ∈
G(4L+5)×(4L+6). It also generates (sk0, pk0) on its own and uses sk0 to compute homomorphic
signatures {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1 on the rows of ρ ∈ Gt×n. The resulting ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) is given
as input to A along with the matrix A = logg(ρ) ∈ Zt×np .
When A halts, it outputs a fake proof pi? for a vector v? ∈ Gn outside Lρ. Then, B parses pi? as(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
and F ? as (F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) ∈
G3. At this point, B aborts in the event that F ?3 = F ?1 1/y1 · F ?2 1/y2 . Otherwise (namely, if
(F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) is not a BBS encryption of 1G), we know that F
? = (F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) is linearly inde-
pendent of the vectors (f1,f2,f0) since f0 ∈ span〈f1,f2〉 and any linear combination of these
is a BBS encryption of 1G. Hence, since f = (f1,f2,f3) is an extractable Groth-Sahai CRS, B
can use the discrete logarithms (y1, y2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2)) to extract (σ
?
1, Z
?, R?, U?) from
their Groth-Sahai commitments C?σ1 ,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U . The perfect soundness of pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2 for the
CRS f = (f1,f2,f3) guarantees that extracted elements (σ
?
1, Z
?, R?, U?) satisfy the verification
equations (7). This means that B can win the LHSPS security game by outputting (Z?, R?, U?)
and the vector
σ? = (σ?1, σ
?
2
1−VK?[1], σ?2
VK?[1], . . . , σ?2
1−VK?[L], σ?2
VK?[L],
σ?3
1−VK?[1], σ?3
VK?[1], . . . , σ
1−VK?[L]
3 , σ
VK?[L]
3 , 1G, 1G, F
?
1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) ∈ G4L+6,
which is necessarily outside the row space of M (5) since F ? is linearly independent of (f1,f2,f0).
Since the bit d ∈R {0, 1} is chosen independently of A’s view, B breaks the security of the
LHSPS scheme with probability /2 if the soundness adversary has advantage . The security result
of [47, Theorem 1] implies the upper bound AdvLHSPSB (λ) ≤ 12 ·AdvDLIN(λ) + 1p for the advantage
of any LHSPS forger B. It follows that Pr[A wins Game1] ≤ AdvDLIN(λ) + 2/p, which yields the
announced upper bound. uunionsq
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E Proof of Lemma 1
Proof. We proceed using a sequence of games where several kinds of simulated proofs and Groth-
Sahai CRSes (f1,f2,F ) may be used by S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) and the adversary.
Type A proof: A proof pi =
(
VK,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu,piσ,1,piσ,2,pi1,pi2, σ
)
of Type A involves a CRS (f1,f2,F ) and a committed signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) which
are identical to those used by the simulator S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) in Game5. They are obtained by
using ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp to construct a signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) on the one-time verification
key VK. Let V = fv and W = hw for vectors v = (v1,0, v1,1, . . . , vL,0, vL,1) ∈ Z2Lp , w =
(w1,0, w1,1, . . . , wL,0, wL,1) ∈ Z2Lp and f1 = gy1 , f2 = gy2 . In a Type A proof, if we write
F = (F1, F2, F3) = f
µ1
1 ·fµ22 ·f0x for some unique triple (µ1, µ2, x) ∈ Z3p (recall that (f1,f2,f0)
form a basis of G3 in Game5), the hidden signature (σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) satisfies
σ1 = g
(ω1+ω2)·x · σF (v,VK)2 · σF (w,VK)3 , (12)
where F (v,VK) =
∑L
`=1 v`,VK[`] and F (w,VK) =
∑L
`=1w`,VK[`], whereas (Z,R,U) is a valid
linearly homomorphic signature on the vector (6). Since this vector is in the row space of M,
(Z,R,U) can be obtained as
Z = Zµ11 · Zµ22 · Zω1·x4L+3 · Zω2·x4L+4 · Zx4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Zr
2+2i−VK[i] · Z
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
R = Rµ11 ·Rµ22 ·Rω1·x4L+3 ·Rω2·x4L+4 ·Rx4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Rr
2+2i−VK[i] ·R
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
U = Uµ11 · Uµ22 · Uω1·x4L+3 · Uω2·x4L+4 · Ux4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
U r
2+2i−VK[i] · U
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
(13)
with r = logf (σ2) and s = logh(σ3). Note that, since f0 = ι(g) · f1ν1 · f2ν2 for some ν1, ν2 ∈ Zp,
F = (F1, F2, F3) can be seen as a BBS encryption of g
x since gx = F
−1/y1
1 · F−1/y22 · F3.
We further define Type A’ proof as a broader class of proofs where only conditions (12) are
required. We do not impose any condition on (Z,R,U) besides being valid homomorphic signature
(or quasi-adaptive proof) on the vectors (6).
In Game5, the simulator always sets x = 1 in all simulated proofs. If the adversary outputs a
Type A’ proof, however, we may have x 6= 1. In honestly generated proofs, we always have x = 0.
We also consider another class of proofs.
Type B proofs: A proof pi =
(
VK,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu,piσ,1,piσ,2,pi1,pi2, σ
)
of Type B is a valid proof that is not of Type A. In these proofs, the commitmentsCσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU
contain group elements (σ1, Z,R, U) such that, if we write F = (F1, F2, F3) as F = f
µ1
1 ·fµ22 ·f0x
for some unique triple (µ1, µ2, x) ∈ Z3p, then (σ1, σ2, σ3) are of the form
σ1 = g
(ω1+ω2+τ)·x ·H(V ,VK)r ·H(W ,VK)s , σ2 = f r , σ3 = hs ,
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for some r, s ∈ Zp and some non-zero τ ∈ Z∗p. Since (Z,R,U) is a valid homomorphic signature
on the vector (6), it must be of the form
Z = g−τ ·x·ϕ1 · Zµ11 · Zµ22 · Zω1·x4L+3 · Zω2·x4L+4 · Zx4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Zr
2+2i−VK[i] · Z
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
R = g−τ ·x·φ1 ·Rµ11 ·Rµ22 ·Rω1·x4L+3 ·Rω2·x4L+4 ·Rx4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Rr
2+2i−VK[i] ·R
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
U = g−τ ·x·ϑ1 · Uµ11 · Uµ22 · Uω1·x4L+3 · Uω2·x4L+4 · Ux4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
U r
2+2i−VK[i] · U
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
for certain exponents (ϕ1, φ1, ϑ1) ∈ Z3p such that (G1, H1) = (Gϕ1z Gφ1r , Hϕ1z Hϑ1u ). We observe
that the vector (6) is outside the row space of M whenever τ 6= 0.
Similarly to Type A proofs, we define Type B’ proofs as a generalization of Type B proofs where
no condition is imposed on the distribution of (Z,R,U) beyond the fact that it should be a valid
linearly homomorphic signature on the vector (6).
It is easy to see that, if event E5 occurs in Game5, the adversary’s fake proof pi
? is necessarily a
Type A’ or Type B’ proof with x 6= 0 either way. We further consider several sub-classes of Type
B proofs.
Type B-k proofs (1 ≤ k ≤ L): These are a special kind of Type B proofs produced by the simu-
lator at some steps of the sequence of games. They are generated by choosing r, s, µ1, µ2, x
R← Zp
and setting F = (F1, F2, F3) = f
µ1
1 · fµ22 · f0x, as well as
σ1 = g
(ω1+ω2)·x · Rk(VK|k)x ·H(V ,VK)r ·H(W ,VK)s , σ2 = f r , σ3 = hs ,
where we define H(V ,VK) =
∏L
`=1 V`,VK[`], H(W ,VK) =
∏L
`=1W`,VK[`] and
Rk : {0, 1}k → G,VK|k 7→ Rk(VK|k)
is a random function that depends on the first k bits of its input VK ∈ {0, 1}L. The (Z,R,U)
components are simulated QA-NIZK proofs of linear subspace membership. They are obtained
using sk1 = {(ϕi, φi, ϑi)}4L+6i=1 to compute a homomorphic signature on the vector (6) by com-
puting 
Z = σ−ϕ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϕ2i+VK[i]
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϕ2L+2i+VK[i]
3 ·
F
−ϕ4L+4
1 · F−ϕ4L+52 · F−ϕ4L+63
R = σ−φ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 φ2i+VK[i]
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 φ2L+2i+VK[i]
3 ·
F
−φ4L+4
1 · F−φ4L+52 · F−φ4L+63
U = σ−ϑ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϑ2i+VK[i]
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϑ2L+2i+VK[i]
3 ·
F
−ϑ4L+4
1 · F−ϑ4L+52 · F−ϑ4L+63
,
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or, equivalently,
Z = Rk(VK|k)
−x·ϕ1 · Zµ11 · Zµ22 · Zω1·x4L+3 · Zω2·x4L+4 · Zx4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Zr
2+2i−VK[i] · Z
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
R = Rk(VK|k)
−x·φ1 ·Rµ11 ·Rµ22 ·Rω1·x4L+3 ·Rω2·x4L+4 ·Rx4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Rr
2+2i−VK[i] ·R
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
U = Rk(VK|k)
−x·ϑ1 · Uµ11 · Uµ22 · Uω1·x4L+3 · Uω2·x4L+4 · Ux4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
U r
2+2i−VK[i] · U
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]
)
.
Finally, we also define Type B’-k proofs as a generalization of Type B-k proofs where (Z,R,U)
is only constrained to be a valid homomorphic signature on the vector (6).
To prove the result, we consider a sequence of games Game5.0,Game5.1,Game5.2.1, . . . ,Game5.2.L,
where Game5.0 coincides with Game5. For each i ∈ {0, . . . , L}, we call E5.i the counterpart of
event E5 in Game5.i (namely, the event that A outputs a fake proof pi? containing a vector F ? =
(F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) which is not a BBS encryption of 1G). We also define Matchi to be the event that, in
Game5.i, the adversary’s fake proof pi
? has the extended type as the simulated proofs it observes.
Namely, if S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) generates a Type A (resp. Type B-k) proof at each query in Game5.i,
Matchi denotes the event that A outputs a Type A’ (resp. Type B’-k) fake proof pi?.
Game5.0: This game is exactly Game5. Namely, the adversary obtains Type A simulated proofs at
each query to S2(ψ, τsim, ., .). At the end of the game, the challenger B checks if A’s fake proof
pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
is a Type A’ proof
and we call Match0 this event. We have Pr[E5.0] = Pr[E5.0 ∧ Match0] + Pr[E5.0 ∧ ¬Match0].
Lemma 2 shows that, if the DLIN assumption holds, pi? can only be a Type B’ proof with
negligible probability. Concretely, we prove that Pr[E5.0 ∧ ¬Match0] ≤ AdvDLING (λ) + 1/p.
Instead of trying to bound Pr[E5.0 ∧Match0] right now, we will wait for a later game where it
will be easier.
Game5.1: This game is like Game5.0 except that, at each query to the simulator S2(ψ, τsim, ., .), the
signature components (Z,R,U) are obtained as simulated QA-NIZK proofs of linear subspace
membership. Namely, instead of computing (Z,R,U) using µ1, µ2, ω1, ω2, r, s ∈ Zp as in (13),
the challenger uses {ϕi, φi, ϑi}4L+6i=1 to compute (Z,R,U) as a one-time linearly homomorphic
signature on the vector σ (6). Clearly, (Z,R,U) has the same distribution as in Game5.0 since
σ ∈ G4L+6 remains in the row space of the matrix M. Hence, A’s view is the same as in Game5.0
and we have Pr[E5.1 ∧ Match1] = Pr[E5.0 ∧ Match0], where Match1 is the equivalent of event
Match0 in Game5.1.
Game5.2.k (1 ≤ k ≤ L): In Game5.2.k, all queries to S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) are answered by returning Type
B-k proofs with x = 1 (this choice of x suffices to guarantee that (f1,f2,F ) will be a perfectly
NIWI CRS). For each k, we define Match2.k to be the event that A outputs a Type B’-k fake
proof pi? in Game5.2.k. Lemma 3 shows that Game5.2.1 is computationally indistinguishable from
Game5.1 under the DLIN assumption in G. In particular, A’s fake proof pi? is not significantly
more likely to depart from the output distribution of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) than in Game5.1: concretely,
we have |Pr[E5.2.1 ∧Match2.1]− Pr[E5.1 ∧Match1]| ≤ 2 ·AdvDLING (λ). Lemma 4 further shows
that, under the DLIN assumption, the probability of A’s fake proof pi? to be of the same type
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as the outputs of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) is nearly the same in Game5.2.k and in Game5.2.(k−1). We have
|Pr[E5.2.k ∧Match2.k]− Pr[E5.2.(k−1) ∧Match2.(k−1)]| ≤ 2 ·AdvDLING (λ).
In Game5.2.L, we obtain |Pr[E5.2.L∧Match2.L]−Pr[E5.0∧Match0]| ≤ 2·L·AdvDLING (λ) by the triangle
inequality. In Game5.2.L, although A only obtains Type B-L proofs during the game, it remains in-
formation theoretically unable to output a Type B’-L proof pi? with a different verification key VK?.
Indeed, a Type B’-L fake proof pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,
pi?2, σ
?
)
would uniquely determine the function evaluation RL(VK
?) from the values (σ?1, σ
?
2, σ
?
3)
and F ? = (F ?1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ). To see this, recall that E5.2.L implies that F
? is a BBS encryption of
gx
?
= F ?1
−1/y1 ·F ?2 −1/y2 ·F ?3 6= 1G, which in turn determines RL(VK?) from (σ?1, σ?2, σ?3). The unpre-
dictability of the random function RL(.) ensures that this event can only occur by pure chance, so
that we have Pr[E5.2.L ∧Match2.L] ≤ 1/p.
When combining the above, we find
Pr[E5.0 ∧Match0] ≤ (2L+ 1) ·AdvDLING (λ) + 2/p,
which yields the announced upper bound for Pr[E5]. uunionsq
The proof of Lemma 1 is completed by the following lemmas.
Lemma 2. In Game5.0, any PPT adversary A outputting a Type B’ fake proof with noticeable prob-
ability  implies an algorithm B with comparable running time and breaking the DLIN assumption
in G with advantage at least − 1/p.
Proof. Let A be a PPT adversary that outputs a Type B’ fake proof pi? with probability  in
Game5.0. We construct an algorithm B that takes as input an SDP instance (gz, gr, hz, hu) ∈ G4
and finds a non-trivial (Z,R,U) ∈ G3 such that e(gz, Z)·e(gr, R) = 1GT and e(hz, Z)·e(hu, U) = 1GT
with probability  · (1− 1/p). Since the SDP assumption is implied by the DLIN assumption under
a linear time reduction, B immediately implies a DLIN distinguisher with the same advantage in
G.
We use A to build a forger B for the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Section 2.3.
Our LHSPS forger B receives as input a public key pkhsps for an instance of the LHSPS scheme
that allows signing vectors of dimension n = 4L + 6 and defines pk1 = pkhsps at step 1 of the
K1 algorithm. It generates the second LHSPS key pair (sk0, pk0) on its own (note that B can
do this because the QA-NIZK simulator does it as well) and faithfully runs steps 2 to 5 of the
K1 algorithm. In particular, it chooses V ,W
R← G2L, u1, u2 R← G, ω1, ω2 R← Zp itself, just like
the extraction trapdoor (y1, y2)
R← Z2p of the Groth-Sahai CRS f = (f1,f2,f3). At step 6 of K1,
it generates {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1 using sk0 and invokes its LHSPS challenger 4L + 5 times to obtain
signatures {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 on the on the rows of the matrix M ∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6) in (5). The
adversary A is run on input of
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f , f0, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W ,
pk0, pk1, {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, pk0, pk1, Ω1, Ω2, V , W
)
,
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and B retains the information τsim =
(
ω1, ω2, {χi, γi, δi}ni=1
)
which will make it possible to emulate
S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) exactly as in Game5. In particular, since B knows ω1, ω2 ∈ Zp, it can simulate proofs
without knowing sk1 = {(ϕi, φi, ϑi)}4L+6i=1 . When A terminates, it outputs a triple (v?, pi?, lbl?) and a
verifying proof pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
. At this
point, B uses the extraction trapdoor (y1, y2) ∈ Z2p of the perfectly binding CRS (f1,f2,f3) to
extract (σ?1, Z
?, R?, U?) from C?σ1 ,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U . The perfect soundness of pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2 ensures that
(Z?, R?, U?) is a valid homomorphic signature on the vector
σ? = (σ?1, σ
?
2
1−VK?[1], σ?2
VK?[1], . . . , σ?2
1−VK?[L], σ?2
VK?[L], σ?3
1−VK?[1], σ?3
VK?[1],
. . . , σ?3
1−VK?[L], σ?3
VK?[L], 1G, 1G, F
?
1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) .
Moreover, the latter evades the row space of M since pi? is a Type B’ proof. Therefore B can win
against its LHSPS challenger by outputting (Z?, R?, U?) and the above vector as a valid forgery.
The result of [47, Theorem 1] implies that B can in turn be used to solve the SDP problem —and
a fortiori break the DLIN assumption in G— with probability  · (1− 1/p) ≥ − 1/p. uunionsq
In the multi-CRS setting, the proof of Lemma 2 readily extends and relies on the tight security
of the LHSPS system of Section 2.3 in the multi-user setting, which was proved in [49, Appendix
G]. Indeed, each CRS ψ(κ) = (CRS
(κ)
1 ,CRS
(κ)
2 ) contains an independent LHSPS public key pk
(κ)
1
and the adversary is simply turned into a successful forger for one of these.
Lemma 3. If the DLIN assumption holds in G, A’s probability to output a Type B′-1 proof in
Game5.2.1 and its probability of outputting a Type A’ proof in Game1 are about the same. Specifically,
there is a DLIN distinguisher B such that |Pr[E5.2.1∧Match2.1]−Pr[E5.1∧Match1]| ≤ 2·AdvDLING (λ)
and running in about the same time as A.
Proof. For the sake of contradiction, let us assume that events E5.2.1 ∧Match2.1 and E1 ∧Match1
occur with substantially different probabilities in Game5.2.1 and Game5.1, respectively. We build a
DLIN distinguisher B which takes as input (f, g, h, fa, hb, T ) and aims at deciding if T = ga+b or
T ∈R G. Analogously to [53] and [22, Lemma 6], B leverages the random self-reducibility of DLIN
so as to build q tuples (Kj = f
aj , Lj = h
bj , Tj) such that, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we have
Tj =
{
gaj+bj if T = ga+b
gaj+bj+τ0 if T ∈R G
for some τ0 ∈R Zp. This is done by picking ρ0 R← Zp and ρaj , ρbj R← Zp, for j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, and
defining
(Kj , Lj , Tj) =
(
(fa)ρ0 · fρaj , (hb)ρ0 · hρbj , T ρ0 · gρaj+ρbj ) , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , q} .
Also, B generates (u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2) ∈ G4 by drawing αu,1, αu,2 R← Zp and setting
u1 = f
αu,1 , u2 = h
αu,2 , Ω1 = (f
a)αu,1 , Ω2 = (h
b)αu,2 .
Before generating the rest of CRS1 and CRS2, B flips a fair coin b† R← {0, 1} as a guess
for the first bit of the one-time verification key VK? = VK[1]? . . .VK[L]? ∈ {0, 1}L that will
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appear in the adversary’s fake proof pi?. To build CRS1 and CRS2, B chooses vectors α =
(α1,0, α1,1, . . . , αL,0, αL,1)
R← Z2Lp , β = (β1,0, β1,1, . . . , βL,0, βL,1) R← Z2Lp and ζ, y1, y2 R← Zp. It
sets f1 = g
y1 and f2 = g
y2 . It also defines the vectors V = (V1,0, V1,1, . . . , VL,0, VL,1) ∈ G2L,
W = (W1,0,W1,1, . . . ,WL,0,WL,1) ∈ G2L by setting
(V`,0, V`,1) = (f
α`,0 , fα`,1) , (W`,0,W`,1) = (h
β`,0 , hβ`,1) , if ` 6= 1
(V1,1−b† , V1,b†) = (f
α
1,1−b† · gζ , fα1,b† ) , (W1,1−b† ,W1,b†) = (hβ1,1−b† · gζ , hβ1,b† ) .
The remaining components of CRS1 and CRS2, including (sk1, pk1) and {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 , are
generated as in the real setup algorithm K1. The adversary A is run on input of
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f , f0, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W , pk0, pk1 ,
{(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, pk0, pk1, Ω1, Ω2, V , W
)
,
and the challenger B keeps (y1, y2, {χi, γi, δi}ni=1, {ϕi, φi, ϑi}4L+6i=1 ) to itself. Note that the simulation
trapdoor τsim is not entirely known to B since (ω1, ω2) = (a, b) ∈ Z2p, which are part of the original
DLIN instance, are not available. Fortunately, B will be able to simulate proofs using {ϕi, φi, ϑi}4L+6i=1
and its challenge value T which is either ga+b or a random element of G.
During the game, the adversary’s queries to the simulator S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) are handled as follows.
If VKj = VK[1]j . . .VK[L]j ∈ {0, 1}L denotes the verification key involved in the j-th query, B’s
answer depends on the first bit VK[1]j of VKj . Specifically, B considers two cases.
– If VK[1]j = b†, B randomly chooses r, s, µ1, µ2 R← Zp and defines the vector F = (F1, F2, F3) as
F = f0 · fµ11 · fµ22 ,
σ1 = T ·H(V ,VKj)r ·H(W ,VKj)s , σ2 = f r , σ3 = hs ,
where H(V ,VKj) =
∏L
`=1 V`,VK[`]j and H(W ,VK
j) =
∏L
`=1W`,VK[`]j . The (Z,R,U) components
of the proof are computed by generating a homomorphic signature on the vector
(σ1, σ2
1−VK[1]j , σ2VK[1]
j
, . . . , σ2
1−VK[L]j , σ2VK[L]
j
, σ3
1−VK[1]j , σ3VK[1]
j
,
. . . , σ3
1−VK[L]j , σ3VK[L]
j
, 1G, 1G, F1, F2, F3),
which is done by computing
Z = σ−ϕ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϕ2i+VK[i]j
2 · σ3−
∑L
i=1 ϕ2L+2i+VK[i]j ·
F
−ϕ4L+4
1 · F−ϕ4L+52 · F−ϕ4L+63
R = σ−φ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 φ2i+VK[i]j
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 φ2L+2i+VK[i]j
3 ·
F
−φ4L+4
1 · F−φ4L+52 · F−φ4L+63
U = σ−ϑ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϑ2i+VK[i]j
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϑ2L+2i+VK[i]j
3 ·
F
−ϑ4L+4
1 · F−ϑ4L+52 · F−ϑ4L+63
. (14)
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Note that, if T = ga+b+τ for some τ ∈R Zp, the obtained triple (Z,R,U) can be written
Z = g−τ ·ϕ1 · Zµ11 · Zµ22 · Za4L+3 · Zb4L+4 · Z4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Zr
2+2i−VK[i]j · Z
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]j
)
R = g−τ ·φ1 ·Rµ11 ·Rµ22 ·Ra4L+3 ·Rb4L+4 ·R4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Rr
2+2i−VK[i]j ·R
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]j
)
U = g−τ ·ϑ1 · Uµ11 · Uµ22 · Ua4L+3 · U b4L+4 · U4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
U r
2+2i−VK[i]j · U
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]j
)
.
We observe that (F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) matches the distribution of pi in Game5.2.1 if
τ 6= 0 and Game5.1 if τ = 0. Indeed, in the former case, we implicitly define the constant
function R0(ε) = g
τ and define the function R1 so that R1(b
†||M ′) = R0(ε) for any string
M ′ ∈ {0, 1}L−1.
– If VK[1]j = 1− b†, B implicitly defines
R1(VK
j
|1) = R1(1− b
†) =
{
R0(ε) · gζ·τ0 if T ∈R G
1 if T = ga+b
.
Namely, for randomly chosen µ1, µ2
R← Zp, B defines F = f0 · f1µ1 · fµ22 and uses the j-th tuple
(Kj , Lj , Tj) to set
σ1 = T ·K
∑L
`=1 α`,VK[`]j
j · L
∑L
`=1 β`,VK[`]j
j · T ζj ,
σ2 = Kj = f
aj , σ3 = Lj = h
bj .
If T = ga+b (and thus Tj = g
aj+bj ), this implicitly defines σ1 = g
(a+b) · H(V ,VKj)aj ·
H(W ,VKj)bj , so that (σ1, σ2, σ3) has the same distribution as in Game5.1. If T = g
a+b+τ (so
that Tj = g
aj+bj+τ0), we can write
σ1 = g
(a+b) · R1(VKj|1) ·H(V ,VK
j)aj ·H(W ,VKj)bj ,
since R1(VK
j
|1) = R0(ε) · gζ·τ0 , which is distributed as in Game5.2.1. In either case, (Z,R,U) are
computed using sk1 = {(ϕi, φi, ϑi)}4L+6i=1 as in the previous case (i.e., as per (14)).
At the end of the game, the adversary A halts and outputs a triple (v?, pi?, lbl?) and a valid fake
proof pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
. At this point, our
distinguisher B aborts and outputs a random bit in the event that VK[1]? 6= b†. Otherwise, it
must determine if the fake proof pi? has the same type as the outputs of the simulator. To this
end, B uses the extraction trapdoor (y1, y2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2)) to extract (σ?1, Z?, R?, U?) from
C?σ1 ,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U . Since VK[1]
? = b†, B can parse F ? as (F ?1 , F ?2 , F ?3 ) and compute F (v,VK?) =∑L
`=1 α`,VK[`]? and F (w,VK
?) =
∑L
`=1 β`,VK[`]? , which in turn yield
η? = σ?1 · σ?2−F (v,VK
?) · σ?3−F (w,VK
?) , F ?0 = F
?
1
−1/y1 · F ?2 −1/y2 · F ?3 .
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If the equality
e(η?, g) = (T, F ?0 ) (15)
holds, B knows that σ?1 = T x · H(V ,VK?)r
? · H(W ,VK?)s? , where r? = logf (σ?2), s? = logh(σ?3)
and x = logg(F
?
0 ). It thus considers pi
? as a fake proof of the same extended type as the outputs
of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) and returns 1. Recall that R0(ε) = T/g
a+b, so that (σ?1, σ
?
2, σ
?
3, F
?
1 , F
?
2 , F
?
3 ) corre-
sponds to a Type A’ proof (resp. Type B’-1) if T = ga+b (resp. T = ga+b+τ with τ 6= 0). Otherwise,
B concludes that pi? has a different distribution than proofs produced by the simulator and out-
puts 0. If the difference between the adversary’s probability to output the same kind of proofs as
S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) in Game5.2.1 and Game5.1 is , then B’s distinguishing advantage is at least /2 since
b† ∈ {0, 1} was chosen independently of A’s view. uunionsq
In the multi-CRS setting, the proof of Lemma 3 easily goes through by having the reduction B
generate a set µ CRSes {ψ(κ) = (CRS(κ)1 ,CRS(κ)2 )}µκ=1, where each CRS(κ)1 contains independent
values of u
(κ)
1 , u
(κ)
2 , Ω
(κ)
1 , Ω
(κ)
2 , for unknown
(
a(κ), b(κ)) = (log
u
(κ)
1
(Ω
(κ)
1 ), logu(κ)2
(Ω
(κ)
2 )
)
, which are
generated using the random self-reducibility of a given DLIN instance. At the beginning of the
game, B generates qµ tuples (K(κ)j , L(κ)j , T (κ)j ) =
(
fa
(κ)
j , hb
(κ)
j , ga
(κ)
j +b
(κ)
j +τ
(κ)
0
)
, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , q}
and κ ∈ {1, . . . , µ}, where {τ (κ)0 }µκ=1 are either all zeroes or uniformly random in Zp. These instances
will be used to implicitly define an independent random function R
(κ)
1 for each CRS ψ
(κ).
Lemma 4. If the DLIN assumption holds in G, A’s probability to output the same (extended) type
of proof as the simulator is about the same in Game5.2.k and Game5.2.(k−1) for any k ∈ {2, . . . , L}.
Namely, there exists a DLIN distinguisher B such that |Pr[E5.2.k ∧ Match2.k] − Pr[E5.2.(k−1) ∧
Match2.(k−1)]| ≤ 2 ·AdvDLING (λ) and running in about the same time as A.
Proof. Let us assume that there exist an adversary A and an index k ∈ {2, . . . , L} such that events
E5.2.k ∧Match2.k and E5.2.(k−1) ∧Match2.(k−1) have significantly different occurrence probabilities
in Game5.2.k and Game5.2.(k−1), respectively. Out of A, we construct a DLIN distinguisher B as
follows. Algorithm B inputs (f, g, h, fa, hb, T ) and has to decide if T = ga+b or T ∈R G. As in [22,
Lemma 6], B can take advantage of the random self-reducibility of DLIN in order to build q tuples
(Kj = f
aj , Lj = h
bj , Tj)
such that, for each j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, we have
Tj =
{
gaj+bj if T = ga+b
gaj+bj+τj if T ∈R G
for τ1, . . . , τq ∈R Zp. This is achieved by picking ρj , ρaj , ρbj R← Zp and setting
(Kj , Lj , Tj) =
(
(fa)ρj · fρaj , (hb)ρj · hρbj , T ρj · gρaj+ρbj ) , ∀j ∈ {1, . . . , q} .
Before generating CRS1 and CRS2, B flips a fair binary coin b† R← {0, 1} as a guess for the
k-th bit VK[k]? of the one-time verification key VK? = VK[1]? . . .VK[L]? ∈ {0, 1}L contained in
A’s fake proof pi?. To prepare CRS1 and CRS2, B picks u1, u2 R← G, ω1, ω2 R← Zp, y1, y2 R← Zp,
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ζ
R← Zp and vectors α = (α1,0, α1,1, . . . , αL,0, αL,1) R← Z2Lp , β = (β1,0, β1,1, . . . , βL,0, βL,1) R← Z2Lp . It
sets Ω1 = u
ω1
1 , Ω2 = u
ω2
2 , f1 = g
y1 , f2 = g
y2 and defines the vectors V = (V1,0, V1,1, . . . , VL,0, VL,1),
W = (W1,0,W1,1, . . . ,WL,0,WL,1) as
(V`,0, V`,1) = (f
α`,0 , fα`,1) , (W`,0,W`,1) = (h
β`,0 , hβ`,1) , if ` 6= k ,
(Vk,1−b† , Vk,b†) = (f
α
k,1−b† · gζ , fαk,b† ) , (Wk,1−b† ,Wk,b†) = (hβk,1−b† · gζ , hβk,b† ) .
Other components of (CRS1,CRS2), including (sk1, pk1) and {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1 , are faithfully
generated as in the real algorithm K1.
The adversary A is run on input of
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f , f0, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W , pk0, pk1,
{(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, pk0, pk1, Ω1, Ω2, V , W
)
,
and the challenger B retains (y1, y2, ω1, ω2, {χi, γi, δi}ni=1, {ϕi, φi, ϑi}4L+6i=1 ) for later use.
At the outset of the game, B picks a random function Rk−1 : {0, 1}k−1 → G which will be used
to construct another random function Rk : {0, 1}k → G such that, for any string M ∈ {0, 1}k−1, we
have Rk(M ||b†) = Rk−1(M) while Rk(M ||1− b†) takes an independent value.
Then, B starts answering simulation queries. Let VKj = VK[1]j . . .VK[L]j be the one-time
verification key involved in the j-th query to S2(ψ, τsim, ., .). The response of B will depend on the
k-th bit VK[k]j of VKj . Namely, B considers the following three cases.
– If VK[k]j = b†, B exploits the property that Rk(VKj|k) = Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1). It picks r, s
R← Zp and
defines
σ1 = g
ω1+ω2 · Rk−1(VKj|k−1) ·H(V ,VK
j)r ·H(W ,VKj)s ,
σ2 = f
r , σ3 = h
s ,
where H(V ,VKj) =
∏L
`=1 V`,VK[`]j and H(W ,VK
j) =
∏L
`=1W`,VK[`]j . It also computes the
vector F as F = (F1, F2, F3) = f0 ·fµ11 ·fµ22 for random µ1, µ2 R← Zp. The (Z,R,U) components
of the proof are obtained by using sk1 to generate a homomorphic structure-preserving signature
on the vector
(σ1, σ2
1−VK[1]j , σ2VK[1]
j
, . . . , σ2
1−VK[L]j , σ2VK[L]
j
, σ3
1−VK[1]j , σ3VK[1]
j
,
. . . , σ3
1−VK[L]j , σ3VK[L]
j
, 1G, 1G, F1, F2, F3)
by computing 
Z = σ−ϕ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϕ2i+VK[i]j
2 · σ3−
∑L
i=1 ϕ2L+2i+VK[i]j ·
F
−ϕ4L+4
1 · F−ϕ4L+52 · F−ϕ4L+63
R = σ−φ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 φ2i+VK[i]j
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 φ2L+2i+VK[i]j
3 ·
F
−φ4L+4
1 · F−φ4L+52 · F−φ4L+63
U = σ−ϑ11 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϑ2i+VK[i]j
2 · σ
−∑Li=1 ϑ2L+2i+VK[i]j
3 ·
F
−ϑ4L+4
1 · F−ϑ4L+52 · F−ϑ4L+63
. (16)
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Note that (Z,R,U) can be written
Z = Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1)
−ϕ1 · Zµ11 · Zµ22 · Zω14L+3 · Zω24L+4 · Z4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Zr
2+2i−VK[i]j · Z
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]j
)
R = Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1)
−φ1 ·Rµ11 ·Rµ22 ·Rω14L+3 ·Rω24L+4 ·R4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
Rr
2+2i−VK[i]j ·R
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]j
)
U = Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1)
−ϑ1 · Uµ11 · Uµ22 · Uω14L+3 · Uω24L+4 · U4L+5 ·∏L
i=1
(
U r
2+2i−VK[i]j · U
s
2+2L+2i−VK[i]j
)
.
We remark that (F1, F2, F3, σ1, σ2, σ3, Z,R, U) have the appropriate distribution in both Game5.2.(k−1)
and Game5.2.k since Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1) = Rk(VK
j
|k).
– If VK[k]j = 1− b† and Rk(VKj|k) has not been defined yet, B will implicitly define
Rk(VK
j
|k) = Rk(VK
j
|k−1 ||1− b
†) =
{
Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1) · gζ·τj if T ∈R G
Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1) if T = g
a+b
.
Namely, B computes F = (F1, F2, F3) = f0 · fµ11 · fµ22 for µ1, µ2 R← Zp and uses the j-th tuple
(Kj , Lj , Tj) to set
σ1 = g
ω1+ω2 · Rk−1(VKj|k−1) ·K
∑L
`=1 α`,VK[`]j
j · L
∑L
`=1 β`,VK[`]j
j · T ζj ,
σ2 = Kj = f
aj , σ3 = Lj = h
bj .
If Tj = g
aj+bj , the above implicitly defines
σ1 = g
ω1+ω2 · Rk−1(VKj|k−1) ·H(V ,VK
j)aj ·H(W ,VKj)bj ,
so that (σ1, σ2, σ3) has the same distribution as in Game5.2.(k−1). If Tj = gaj+bj+τj , we can write
σ1 = g
ω1+ω2 · Rk(VKj|k) ·H(V ,VK
j)aj ·H(W ,VKj)bj ,
since Rk(VK
j
|k) = Rk−1(VK
j
|k−1) · gζ·τj , which is distributed as in Game5.2.k. In either case,
(Z,R,U) is computed using sk1 = {(ϕi, φi, ϑi)}4L+6i=1 as per (16).
– If VK[k]j = 1− b† and Rk(VKj|k) was defined, B recalls the index j′ < j of the query where this
value was defined. It sets f0 = (F1, F2, F3) = f0 · fµ11 · fµ22 for randomly chosen µ1, µ2 R← Zp. It
also picks r, s
R← Zp and re-uses the j′-th tuple (Kj′ , Hj′ , Tj′) to set
σ1 = g
ω1+ω2 · Rk−1(VKj|k−1) ·K
∑L
`=1 α`,VK[`]j
j′ ·H
∑L
`=1 β`,VK[`]j
j′ · T ζj′ ·
H(V ,VKj)r ·H(W ,VKj)s ,
σ2 = Kj′ · f r = faj′+r , σ3 = Hxj′ · hs = hbj′+s ,
and generates (Z,R,U) using sk1 = {(ϕi, φi, ϑi)}4L+6i=1 as in the previous cases.
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At the end of the game, the adversary A outputs a triple (v?, pi?, lbl?) together with a convincing
proof pi? =
(
VK?,F ?,C?σ1 , σ
?
2, σ
?
3,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U ,C
?
z,C
?
r ,C
?
u,pi
?
σ,1,pi
?
σ,2,pi
?
1,pi
?
2, σ
?
)
. At this point, our
distinguisher B halts and outputs a random bit if it happens that VK[k]? 6= b†. Otherwise, B can
figure out if pi? is of the same (extended) type as the outputs of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .). Since VK[k]
? =
b†, B is able to compute F (v,VK?) = ∑L`=1 α`,VK[`]? and F (w,VK?) = ∑L`=1 β`,VK[`]? and can
use the extraction trapdoor (y1, y2) = (logg(f1), logg(f2)) to extract (σ
?
1, Z
?, R?, U?) from their
commitments C?σ1 ,C
?
Z ,C
?
R,C
?
U . This allows B to compute
η? = σ?1 · σ?2−F (v,VK
?) · σ?3−F (w,VK
?) , F ?0 = F
?
1
−1/y1 · F ?2 −1/y2 · F ?3 .
If e(η?, g) = e(gω1+ω2 · Rk−1(VK?|k−1), F ?0 ), B knows that σ?1 is of the form
σ?1 = g
(ω1+ω2)·x · Rk−1(VK?|k−1)x ·H(V ,VK?)r
? ·H(W ,VK?)s? , (17)
where r? = logf (σ
?
2), s
? = logh(σ
?
3) and x = logg(F
?
0 ). Therefore B can conclude that pi? is a fake
proof of the same (extended) type as those generated by the simulated S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) and outputs 1.
Indeed, given that Rk−1(VK?|k−1) = Rk(VK
?
|k), if the equality (17) holds, pi
? has the same distribution
as outputs of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) in both Game5.2.k and Game5.2.(k−1). Otherwise, B concludes that pi?
deviates from the output distribution of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) and outputs 0. If the difference between pi
?’s
probability to emulate the behavior of S2(ψ, τsim, ., .) in Game5.2.k and Game5.2.(k−1) is , then B’s
advantage as a DLIN distinguisher is at least /2 given that the choice of b† ∈ {0, 1} is independent
of A’s view. uunionsq
In the multi-CRS setting, the proof of Lemma 4 can be adapted in the same way as the proof
of Lemma 3. In short, B generates a set µ independent CRSes {ψ(κ) = (CRS(κ)1 ,CRS(κ)2 )}µκ=1,
where each (CRS
(κ)
1 ,CRS
(κ)
2 ) contains fresh vectors V
(κ),W (κ) in which B embeds the generators
(f, h, g). At the beginning of the game, B generates q · µ tuples
(K
(κ)
j , L
(κ)
j , T
(κ)
j ) =
(
fa
(κ)
j , hb
(κ)
j , ga
(κ)
j +b
(κ)
j +τ
(κ)
j
)
j ∈ {1, . . . , q}, κ ∈ {1, . . . , µ} ,
where τ
(κ)
j may be zero or not. These randomized DLIN instances —which all have the same answer
determined by that of the original DLIN instance— will be used to define µ independent random
functions R
(κ)
k−1 : {0, 1}k → G.
F Proof of Theorem 4
Before describing the scheme and giving its security proof, let us first recall the definition of chosen-
ciphertext security in the multi-user setting in the sense of Bellare, Boldyreva and Micali [7].
F.1 Public-Key Encryption in the Multi-User Setting
In the multi-user setting [7], a public-key encryption scheme consists of algorithms (Par-Gen,Keygen,
Encrypt,Decrypt), where Par-Gen takes as input a security parameter λ and generates common public
parameters Γ shared by all users, Keygen takes as input Γ and outputs a key pair (SK,PK), and
algorithms Encrypt and Decrypt that proceed in the usual way.
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Definition 4 ([7]). A public-key encryption scheme is (µ, qe)-IND-CCA secure, for integers µ, qe ∈
poly(λ), if no PPT adversary has noticeable advantage in this game:
1. The challenger first generates Γ ← Par-Gen(λ) and runs (SK(i), PK(i))← Keygen(Γ ) for i = 1
to µ. It gives {PK(i)}µi=1 to the adversary A and retains {SK(i)}µi=1. In addition, the challenger
initializes a set D ← ∅ and a counter jq ← 0. Finally, it chooses a random bit d R← {0, 1}.
2. The adversary A adaptively makes queries to the following oracles on multiple occasions:
– Encryption query: A chooses an index i ∈ {1, . . . , µ} and a pair (M0,M1) of equal-length
messages. If jq = qe, the oracle returns ⊥. Otherwise, it computes C ← Encrypt(PK(i),Md)
and returns C. In addition, it sets D ← D ∪ {(i, C)} and jq ← jq + 1.
– Decryption query: A can also invoke the decryption oracle on arbitrary ciphertexts C and
indexes i ∈ {1, . . . , µ}. If (i, C) ∈ D, the oracle returns ⊥. Otherwise, the oracle returns
M ← Decrypt(SK(i), C), which may be ⊥ if C is an invalid ciphertext.
3. The adversary A outputs a bit d′ and is deemed successful if d′ = d. As usual, A’s advantage is
measured as the distance Adv(A) = |2 · Pr[d′ = d]− 1|.
The proof that the scheme of Section 5.1 provides (1, qe)-IND-CCA security applies standard
techniques [55,58] and proceeds as follows.
Proof. The proof uses of a sequence of games starting with a game where the challenger’s hidden
bit is d = 0 and ending with a game where d = 1. For each i, Si is the event that A wins in Gamei.
Game1: is the real attack game where the challenger’s bit is d = 0. In details, the adversary is given
the public key PK while the challenger keeps the private keys SK to itself. At each decryption
query, B faithfully runs the real decryption algorithm using the private key SK = (x1, y1). At the
j-th encryption query, for j ∈ {1, . . . , qe}, the adversary A chooses messages M (j)0 ,M (j)1 ∈ G and
obtains a challenge ciphertext C?j = (C
?
j,0, C
?
j,1, C
?
j,2, D
?
j,0, D
?
j,1, D
?
j,2, pi
?
j ) which is an encryption
of M
(j)
0 . Decryption queries are disallowed for ciphertexts C returned by the encryption oracle.
Eventually, A halts and outputs a bit d′ ∈ {0, 1}. We denote by S1 the event that d′ = 0.
Game2: We change the decryption oracle. Instead of faithfully using the private key SK = (x1, y1) to
compute M = C0 ·C−1/x11 ·C−1/y12 at each valid decryption query C = (C0, C1, C2, D0, D1, D2, pi),
B recalls the values (x2, y2) ∈ Z2p and computes the plaintext as M = D0 ·D1/x21 ·D1/y22 . Clearly,
A’s view will not be affected by this change unless it is able to invoke the decryption oracle on a
valid-looking ciphertext although (C0, C1, C2) and (D0, D1, D2) are BBS encryptions of distinct
messages. If we call the latter event E2, we have the inequality |Pr[S1] − Pr[S2]| ≤ Pr[E2].
Moreover, event E2 would contradict the enhanced soundness of the proof system, which is
tightly related to the DLIN assumption as shown by Theorem 2. Concretely, the probability of
E2 is at most Pr[E2] ≤ 2 ·AdvDLIN(λ) + 2/p.
Game3: This game is like Game2 except that, at each encryption query (M
(j)
0 ,M
(j)
1 ), the returned
ciphertext C?j = (C
?
j,0, C
?
j,1, C
?
j,2, D
?
j,0, D
?
j,1, D
?
j,2, pi
?) is obtained by computing pi? as a simulated
proof using the simulation trapdoor τsim associated with the language ρ defined by PK. The
quasi-adaptive zero-knowledge property of the simulation-sound proof system guarantees that
A’s view will not be affected by this change. We have Pr[S3] = Pr[S2].
Game4: We modify the treatment of encryption queries {(M (j)0 ,M (j)1 )}qej=1. When B computes the
j-th challenge ciphertext C?j = (C
?
j,0, C
?
j,1, C
?
j,2, D
?
j,0, D
?
j,1, D
?
j,2, pi
?), it computes a hybrid ci-
phertext where (C?j,0, C
?
j,1, C
?
j,2) is a BBS encryption of M
(j)
1 and (D
?
j,0, D
?
j,1, D
?
j,2) is a BBS
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encryption of M
(j)
0 . It is easy to prove that any PPT adversary A having noticeably different
behaviors in Game3 and Game4 would imply an adversary against the semantic security of the
BBS cryptosystem in the multi-challenge setting, which would contradict the DLIN assumption.
Indeed, Hofheinz and Jager proved [37, Theorem 6] that the multi-challenge (and multi-user)
semantic security of BBS is tightly related to the DLIN assumption. The result of [37, Theorem
6] implies that |Pr[S4]− Pr[S3]| ≤ AdvDLIN(λ) + 1/p.
Game5: We modify again the decryption oracle. This time, instead of using the secondary private
key (x2, y2) to recover the plaintext M = D0 ·D−1/x21 ·D−1/y22 at each valid decryption query
C = (C0, C1, C2, D0, D1, D2, pi), the challenger B switches back to using the actual private key
SK = (x1, y1) to compute M = C0 · C−1/x11 · C−1/y12 . It is easy to see that A’s view will be the
same as in Game4 until A manages to query the decryption oracle on a valid-looking ciphertext
C for which (C0, C1, C2) and (D0, D1, D2) encrypt distinct messages. If we denote by E5 the
latter event, we claim that it contradicts the enhanced unbounded simulation-soundness of the
underlying proof system.
Indeed, B can be turned into an adversary that breaks the latter property with advantage
Pr[E5] for the language Lρ, where
ρ =

X1 1 g X1 1
1 Y1 g Y1 1
X2 1 g 1 X2
1 Y2 g 1 Y2
 ∈ G4×5,
for uniformly randomX1, X2, Y1, Y2, g
R← G. To this end, B interacts with a simulation-soundness
challenger which supplies it with a common reference string (Γ, ψ = (CRS1,CRS2)), where
CRS1 contains a description of the language Lρ. In addition, B receives the matrix of discrete
logarithms A = log(ρ) ∈ Z4×5p which allows deciding membership in Lρ. Using A and ψ, B can
construct a properly distributed public key PK of which it knows the private key SK = (x1, y1)
and its twin (x2, y2) that are part of A = log(ρ). Hence, B can interact with the CCA2 adver-
sary A in the same way as the challenger of Game5 does. Also, B can recognize the first fatal
decryption query C = (C†0, C
†
1, C
†
2, D
†
0, D
†
1, D
†
2, pi
†) (i.e., the first valid query where (C†0, C
†
1, C
†
2)
and (D†0, D
†
1, D
†
2) are BBS encryptions of distinct messages) since it knows (x1, y1, x2, y2). At
this point, B halts and outputs (v†, pi†) where
v† =
(
C†1/D
†
1, C
†
2/D
†
2, C
†
0/D
†
0, C
†
1 · C†2, D†1
−1 ·D†2
−1)
,
which breaks the enhanced unbounded simulation-soundness of the QA-NIZK proof system.
The result of Theorem 3 implies that
|Pr[S5]− Pr[S4]| ≤ Pr[E5] ≤ Advqe-suf-otsB′ (λ) + 3 · (L+ 2) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + 4/p .
Game6: In this game, we bring yet another modification to the generation of challenge ciphertexts
C?j = (C
?
j,0, C
?
j,1, C
?
j,2, D
?
j,0, D
?
j,1, D
?
j,2, pi
?). Namely, in all encryption queries {(M (j)0 ,M (j)1 )}qej=1,
instead of generating a hybrid ciphertext where the built-in BBS ciphertexts encrypt distinct
messages, (C?j,0, C
?
j,1, C
?
j,2), and (D
?
j,0, D
?
j,1, D
?
j,2) are both calculated by encrypting M
(j)
1 . It is
easy to prove that any noticeable change in A’s behavior between Game5 and Game6 would
imply an IND-CPA adversary against the BBS cryptosystem in the multi-challenge setting.
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The result of [37, Theorem 6] thus implies |Pr[S6] − Pr[S5]| ≤ AdvDLIN(λ) + 1/p. Note that,
for each ciphertext C?j , the vectors (C
?
j,1/D
?
j,1, C
?
j,2/D
?
j,2, C
?
j,0/D
?
j,0, C
?
j,1 ·C?j,2, (D?j,1 ·D?j,2)−1) are
now back in the linear span of X1,Y 1,X2,Y 2.
Game7: We bring one last change to the generation of the challenge ciphertexts {C?j }qej=1. For each
ciphertext C?j , instead of computing pi
?
j using the simulation trapdoor τsim, we compute it using
the witnesses (θj,1, θj,2,−θj,3,−θj,4) ∈ Z4p. This change is only conceptual since the obtained
proofs have the same distribution as in Game6. We have Pr[S7] = Pr[S6].
We observe that Game7 corresponds to the actual game where the challenger’s bit is d = 1. If we
combine the above, we thus find the announced upper bound for the distance |Pr[S1]−Pr[S7]|. uunionsq
G More Efficient (Almost) Tight Chosen-Ciphertext Security in the
Key-Dependent Message Setting
In this section, we apply our unbounded simulation-sound QA-NIZK argument system in the context
of key-dependent-message (KDM) security. Specifically, we describe an almost tightly secure variant
of the KDM-CCA2 secure cryptosystem suggested by Camenisch, Chandran and Shoup [19] with
substantially shorter ciphertexts than in previous tightly secure solutions.
Key-dependent message security [11] refers to encryption schemes that remain secure when the
adversary obtains encryptions of functions of the secret key. The Camenisch et al. scheme can
be seen as a chosen-ciphertext-secure variant of the construction initially given by Boneh, Halevi,
Hamburg and Ostrovsky [18] (BHHO). The schemes of [18,19] both need O(`) group elements in
the ciphertext, where ` is proportional to the security parameter.
Camenisch, Chandran and Shoup [19] combined the BHHO construction with the Naor-Yung
paradigm [55] in order to attain chosen-ciphertext security. In their constructions, they need NIZK
proofs of plaintext equalities consisting of O(`) group elements. Recent works by Libert et al. [48]
and Jutla and Roy [42] independently showed how to achieve KDM-CCA2 security using proofs of
plaintext equalities made of O(1) group elements. Unfortunately, their security reduction is affected
by the number qe of challenge ciphertexts obtained by the adversary. Using our simulation-sound
proofs, we can eliminate the latter disadvantage and obtain nearly tight KDM-CCA2 without
sacrificing the constant-size proofs of plaintext equalities. In comparison with [19], the O(`)-size
Groth-Sahai-based proof of [19] is traded for a tightly simulation-sound argument comprised of 42
group elements.
Before outlining the construction, we first recall the definition of chosen-ciphertext security in
the KDM setting. Let S be the space of secret keys produced by the key generation algorithm of a
public-key encryption scheme. Let N > 0 be an integer and let C = {f : SN →M} be a family of
functions, where M is the message space.
Definition 5 ([19]). A public-key encryption scheme (Keygen,Encrypt,Decrypt) is KDM-CCA2
secure for the function family C if no PPT adversary has non-negligible advantage in the game
below.
1. The challenger runs the Keygen algorithm N times to generate pairs (pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkN , skN )
and sends (pk1, . . . , pkN ) to the adversary. The challenger also flips a random binary coin
d
R← {0, 1}.
2. The adversary interleaves the following kinds of queries.
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Encryption queries: A specifies a pair (i, f), where i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and f ∈ C. The challenger
sets M = f(sk1, . . . , skN ) ∈ M. If d = 0, the challenger returns C = Encrypt(pki,M). If
d = 1, it returns C = Encrypt(pki, 0
|M |) and stores the pair (i, C) in the list L of target
ciphertexts, which is initially empty.
Decryption queries: A submits a pair (i, C). If (i, C) ∈ L, the challenger returns ⊥. Other-
wise, it returns M ← Decrypt(ski, C).
3. The adversary A outputs a bit d′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins if d′ = d. As usual, A’s advantage is defined
to be Advkdm-cca2(A) = |Pr[d′ = d]− 1/2|.
So far, the most efficient KDM-CCA2-secure construction is a scheme due to Hofheinz [39], which re-
lies on the DLIN and Composite Residuosity [56] assumptions. While much more efficient than [19],
his construction relies on several number theoretic assumptions and it is not known to provide tight
security. The results of [37,4] do imply tight KDM-CCA2 security but, for typical choices of param-
eters, their simulation-sound proofs introduce several hundreds of group elements in the ciphertext,
as discussed below. Our unbounded simulation-sound QA-NIZK proofs improve upon those tightly
KDM-CCA2 constructions in that the KDM-CCA2 system is only longer than its underlying KDM-
CPA variant (due to [18] and described in [19, Section 4.2]) by 42 group elements. Also, while our
scheme does not compete with [39] from an efficiency point of view, its security proof only re-
quires the DLIN assumption. Like [19], it applies the Naor-Yung paradigm to show that a BHHO
ciphertext [18] encrypts the same message as a BBS ciphertext [15]. It goes as follows.
Keygen(λ):
1. Run the K0 algorithm of Section 3 to obtain Γ =
(
(G,GT ), f, g, h,Σ
)
and set ` = d4 log pe.
Then, choose generators g
R← G, g1, . . . , g` R← G, h1, . . . , h` R← G as well as x, y R← Zp a `-bit
string s = s1 . . . s`
R← {0, 1}`. Then, define X = gx, Y = gy, g0 =
∏`
i=1 g
−si
i , h0 =
∏`
i=1 h
−si
i .
Next, construct the linearly independent vectors
g = (g0, g1, . . . , g`, 1, 1) ∈ G`+3, h = (h0, h1, . . . , h`, 1, 1) ∈ G`+3
X = (g, 1, . . . , 1, X, 1) ∈ G`+3, Y = (g, 1, . . . , 1, 1, Y ) ∈ G`+3
and erase the exponents x, y ∈ Zp.
2. Run algorithm K1(Γ,ρ) of Section 3 to generate a CRS for a QA-NIZK proof system, where
the language parameter is the matrix ρ ∈ G4×(`+3) whose rows consist of the vectors g, h,
X and Y . Let ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) be the obtained CRS, where
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f , f0, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W , pk0, pk1,
{(zi, ri, ui)}4i=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, pk0, pk1, Ω1, Ω2, V , W
)
.
3. Define the private key as SK = (gs1 , . . . , gs`) ∈ G`. The public key is defined to be
PK =
(
g, X, Y, {gi}`i=0, {hi}`i=0, ψ = (CRS1,CRS2)
)
.
Encrypt(M,PK): to encrypt M ∈ G under the public key PK, do the following.
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1. Choose θ1, θ2
R← Zp and compute
C0 = M · gθ10 · hθ20 , C1 = gθ11 hθ21 , C2 = gθ12 hθ22 , . . . , C` = gθ1` hθ2`
2. Choose θ3, θ4
R← Zp and compute
D0 = M · gθ3+θ4 , D1 = Xθ3 , D2 = Y θ4 .
3. Define the label lbl = (C0, C1, . . . , C`, D0, D1, D2) and, for this label, generate a simulation-
sound QA-NIZK proof pi that the vector
v =
(
C0/D0, C1, . . . , C`, D
−1
1 , D
−1
2
)
=
(
gθ10 · hθ20 · g−θ3−θ4 , gθ11 · hθ21 , . . . , gθ1` · hθ2` , X−θ3 , Y −θ4
) (18)
belongs to span〈g,h,X,Y 〉. This is done by running Steps 1-7 of algorithm P in Section
3.2. Then, output the ciphertext
C = (C0, C1, . . . , C`, D0, D1, D2, pi), (19)
where the proof pi is comprised of 38 group elements and a one-time key pair (VK, σ).
Decrypt(SK,C): parse the private key as SK = (v1, . . . , v`) ∈ G` and the ciphertext as in (19).
Return ⊥ if C does not parse properly or if pi is not an accepting QA-NIZK proof that the vector(
C0/D0, C1, . . . , C`, D
−1
1 , D
−1
2
)
lives in span〈g,h,X,Y 〉. Otherwise, conduct the following steps.
1. For i = 1 to `, set si = 1 if vi 6= 1G and si = 0 otherwise.
2. Output M = C0 ·
∏`
i=1C
si
i .
In the above system, pi only consists of 42 group elements in an instantiation with the one-
time signature of [37]. In comparison, all previous simulation-sound or simulation-extractable proof
systems [37,4,49] enabling tight KDM-CCA2 security would require to prove Θ(`) linear pairing
product equations, each of which takes 3 group elements. For example, the simulation-extractable
proof of [4] – which allows eliminating (D0, D1, D2) from the ciphertext – requires Groth-Sahai
commitments to (M,W1,W2) = (M, g
θ1 , gθ2) and NIWI proofs for the equations e(C0/M, g) =
e(g0,W1) · e(h0,W1) and e(Ci, g) = e(gi,W1) · e(hi,W2) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , `}, which demands
d12 log pe+ 69 group elements in an instantiation with the signature scheme of [49]. This incurs a
total of d16 log pe+ 70 group elements per ciphertext.
Our ciphertexts only take d4 log pe+45 group elements, which is nearly 75% shorter than in the
best previous tightly secure KDM-CCA2 system for any realistic security parameter. Our scheme is
– up to an additive overhead of 42 group elements – essentially as efficient as its KDM-CPA variant.
Although it remains significantly less efficient than Hofheinz’s KDM-CCA2-secure construction [39],
it turns out to be the most efficient scheme with (nearly) tight KDM-CCA2 security to date.
The security in the sense of Definition 5 is proved using standard arguments and we omit the
details of the proof, which proceeds exactly like the one of Camenisch et al. [19, Appendix A.1]. It
naturally reduces the KDM-CCA2 security of the system to the KDM-CPA security of the BHHO
construction [19, Section 4.2] (in particular, all encryption queries are relayed to the KDM-CPA
challenger) and the enhanced unbounded simulation-soundness of our QA-NIZK proof system of
Section 3.2 in the multi-CRS setting. The adversary’s advantage is bounded as in Theorem 4 but,
in the multi-user setting, we need an additional term N/p.
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Theorem 5. The scheme is KDM-CCA2 secure assuming that: (i) Σ is a strongly unforgeable one-
time signature; (ii) The DLIN assumption holds in G. For any adversary A, there is a one-time
signature forger B′ and a DLIN distinguisher B with running times tB, tB′ ≤ tA+qe ·poly(λ, L) such
that Advkdm-ccaA (λ) ≤ Advqe-suf-otsB′ (λ) + (3L+ 10) ·AdvDLINB (λ) + (8 +N)/p, where L is the length
of one-time verification keys, N is the number of public keys and qe is the number of encryption
queries.
H Extension to Asymmetric Pairings
In this section, we explain how to adapt our QA-NIZK proof system in the context of asymmetric
pairings e : G× Gˆ→ GT , with G 6= Gˆ. We consider both Type II pairings, where an isomorphism
ψ : Gˆ→ G is efficiently computable, and Type III pairings, as defined in [32].
The only changes are that certain proof elements have to be in Gˆ and, in the case of Type
III pairings, the security proof has to rely on a slightly stronger version of the Decision Linear
assumption where the challenge value is in G× Gˆ.
K0(λ): choose asymmetric bilinear groups (G, Gˆ,GT ) of prime order p > 2λ with f, g, h
R← G.
Choose a strongly unforgeable one-time signature Σ = (G,S,V) with verification keys consisting
of L-bit strings, for a suitable L ∈ poly(λ). Then, output Γ = (G, Gˆ,GT , f, g, h,Σ).
The dimensions (t, n) of the matrix A ∈ Zt×np such that ρ = gA can be either fixed or part of the
language, so that t, n can be given as input to the CRS generation algorithm K1.
K1(Γ,ρ): parse Γ as (G,GT , f, g, h,Σ) and ρ as a matrix ρ =
(
Gi,j
)
1≤i≤t,
1≤j≤n
∈ Gt×n.
1. Generate key pairs {(skb, pkb)}1b=0 for the one-time linearly homomorphic signature of Sec-
tion 2.3 in order to sign vectors of Gn and G4L+6, respectively. Namely, pick generators
gˆz, gˆr, hˆz, hˆu
R← Gˆ and Gˆz, Gˆr, Hˆz, Hˆu R← Gˆ. Then, for i = 1 to n, choose χi, γi, δi R← Zp and
compute gˆi = gˆz
χi gˆr
γi and hˆi = hˆz
χi
hˆu
δi
. Let sk0 = {χi, γi, δi}ni=1 be the private key and
let pk0 =
(
gˆz, gˆr, hˆz, hˆu, {gˆi, hˆi}ni=1
)
be the matching public key. The second pair (sk1, pk1)
is generated analogously as sk1 = {ϕi, φi, ϑi}4L+6i=1 and
pk1 =
(
Gˆz, Gˆr, Hˆz, Hˆu, {Gˆi = GˆzϕiGˆrφi , Hˆi = HˆzϕiHˆuϑi}4L+6i=1
)
.
2. Choose y1, y2, ξ1, ξ2, ξ3
R← Zp and compute f1 = gy1 , f2 = gy2 . Define vectors f1 = (f1, 1G, g),
f2 = (1G, f2, g) and f3 = f1
ξ1 ·f2ξ2 · ι(g)ξ3 , where ι(g) = (1G, 1G, g). Define the Groth-Sahai
CRS f = (f1,f2,f3). Then, define yet another vector f0 = f1
ν1 · f2ν2 , with ν1, ν2 R← Zp.
3. For ` = 1 to L, choose V`,0, V`,1,W`,0,W`,1
R← G and define row vectors
V = (V1,0, V1,1, . . . , VL,0, VL,1) ∈ G2L, W = (W1,0,W1,1, . . . ,WL,0,WL,1) ∈ G2L .
4. Choose random ω1, ω2
R← Zp, u1, u2 R← G, and compute Ω1 = uω11 ∈ G, Ω2 = uω22 ∈ G.
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5. Define the matrix M =
(
Mi,j
)
i,j
∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6) as
(
Mi,j
)
i,j
=

1 11×2L 11×2L 1 1 f1
1 11×2L 11×2L 1 1 f2
V > Idf,2L 12L×2L 12L×1 12L×1 12L×3
W> 12L×2L Idh,2L 12L×1 12L×1 12L×3
g 11×2L 11×2L u1 1 1
1×3
g 11×2L 11×2L 1 u2 1
1×3
1 11×2L 11×2L Ω−11 Ω
−1
2 f0

(20)
with Idf,2L = f
I2L ∈ G2L×2L, Idh,2L = hI2L ∈ G2L×2L, where I2L ∈ Z2L×2Lp is the identity
matrix. Note that the last row allows linking f0 and Ω1, Ω2.
6. Use sk0 to generate one-time linearly homomorphic signatures {(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1 on the vectors
(Gi1, . . . , Gin) ∈ Gn that form the rows of ρ ∈ Gt×n. These signatures are obtained as
(zi, ri, ui) =
( n∏
j=1
G
−χj
i,j ,
n∏
j=1
G
−γj
i,j ,
n∏
j=1
G
−δj
i,j
)
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , t}. Then, use the second LHSPS private key sk1 to sign the rows
Mj = (Mj,1, . . . ,Mj,4L+6) ∈ G4L+6 of the matrix (20) and obtain signatures
(Zj , Rj , Uj) =
( 4L+6∏
k=1
M−ϕkj,k ,
4L+6∏
k=1
M−φkj,k ,
4L+6∏
k=1
M−ϑkj,k
)
for each j ∈ {1, . . . , 4L+ 5}.
7. The CRS ψ = (CRS1,CRS2) consists of two parts which are defined as
CRS1 =
(
ρ, f , f0, u1, u2, Ω1, Ω2, V , W , pk0, pk1,
{(zi, ri, ui)}ti=1, {(Zj , Rj , Uj)}4L+5j=1
)
,
CRS2 =
(
f , f0, pk0, pk1, Ω1, Ω2, V , W
)
,
while the simulation trapdoor is τsim =
(
ω1, ω2, {χi, γi, δi}ni=1
)
.
P(Γ, ψ,v, x, lbl): given v ∈ Gn and a witness x = (x1, . . . , xt) ∈ Ztp such that v = gx·A, generate a
one-time signature key pair (VK, SK)← G(λ) and conduct the following steps.
1. Using {(zj , rj , uj)}tj=1 from CRS1, derive a one-time homomorphic signature (z, r, u) ∈ G3
on the vector v by computing z =
∏t
i=1 z
xi
i , r =
∏t
i=1 r
xi
i and u =
∏t
i=1 u
xi
i .
2. Define a vector F = (F1, F2, F3) = f
µ1
1 · fµ22 , for randomly chosen µ1, µ2 R← Zp.
3. Pick r, s
R← Zp and compute a pseudo-signature σ = (σ1, σ2, σ3) on the one-time verification
key VK = VK[1] . . .VK[L], which is obtained as
σ1 = H(V ,VK)
r ·H(W ,VK)s , σ2 = f r , σ3 = hs ,
with H(V ,VK) =
∏L
`=1 V`,VK[`] and H(W ,VK) =
∏L
`=1W`,VK[`].
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4. Derive a one-time linearly homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) ∈ G3 for pk1 on the vector
σ = (σ1, σ
1−VK[1]
2 , σ
VK[1]
2 , . . . , σ
1−VK[L]
2 , σ
VK[L]
2 , σ
1−VK[1]
3 ,
σ
VK[1]
3 , . . . , σ
1−VK[L]
3 , σ
VK[L]
3 , 1G, 1G, F1, F2, F3) ∈ G4L+6 (21)
which lives in the subspace spanned by the first 4L + 2 rows of M ∈ G(4L+5)×(4L+6). The
coefficients r, s, µ1, µ2 ∈ Zp thus allow deriving a homomorphic signature (Z,R,U) on the
vector σ ∈ G4L+6.
5. Using the CRS f = (f1,f2,f3), generate Groth-Sahai commitments Cσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU ∈ G3.
Then, compute NIWI proofs pˆiσ,1, pˆiσ,2 ∈ Gˆ3 that committed variables (σ1, Z,R, U) satisfy
the pairing product equations
e(Z, Gˆz) · e(R, Gˆr) · e(σ1, Gˆ1) = e(σ2,
L∏
i=1
Gˆ2i+VK[i])
−1 ·
e(σ3,
L∏
i=1
Gˆ2L+2i+VK[i])
−1 ·
3∏
i=1
e(Fi, Gˆ4L+3+i)
−1 ,
(22)
e(Z, Hˆz) · e(U, Hˆu) · e(σ1, Hˆ1) = e(σ2,
L∏
i=1
H2i+VK[i])
−1 ·
e(σ3,
L∏
i=1
Hˆ2L+2i+VK[i])
−1 ·
3∏
i=1
e(Fi, Hˆ4L+3+i)
−1 .
6. Using the vector F ∈ G3 defined at step 2, define a new Groth-Sahai CRS F = (f1,f2,F )
and use it to compute Groth-Sahai commitments
Cz = ι(z) · f θz,11 · f θz,22 · F θz,3 , Cr = ι(r) · f θr,11 · f θr,22 · F θr,3 ,
Cu = ι(u) · f θu,11 · f θu,22 · F θu,3
to (z, r, u) ∈ G3 along with NIWI proofs (pˆi1, pˆi2) ∈ Gˆ6 that v and (z, r, u) satisfy
e(z, gˆz) · e(r, gˆr) =
n∏
i=1
e(vi, gˆi)
−1, e(z, hˆz) · e(u, hˆu) =
n∏
i=1
e(vi, hˆi)
−1 .
Let (Cz,Cr,Cu, pˆi1, pˆi2) ∈ G9 × Gˆ6 be the resulting commitments and proofs.
7. Set σ = S(SK, (v,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu, pˆiσ,1, pˆiσ,2, pˆi1, pˆi2, lbl)) and out-
put
pi =
(
VK,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu, pˆiσ,1, pˆiσ,2, pˆi1, pˆi2, σ
)
. (23)
V(Γ, ψ,v, pi, lbl): parse pi as in (23) and v as (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ Gn. Return 1 if the conditions below
are all satisfied. Otherwise, return 0.
(i) V(VK, (v,F ,Cσ1 , σ2, σ3,CZ ,CR,CU ,Cz,Cr,Cu, pˆiσ,1, pˆiσ,2, pˆi1, pˆi2, lbl), σ) = 1;
(ii) pˆiσ,1, pˆiσ,2 are valid proofs that the variables (σ1, Z,R, U), which are contained in commit-
ments Cσ1 ,CZ ,CR,CU , satisfy the pairing product equations (7).
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(iii) (Cz,Cr,Cu, pˆi1, pˆi2) forms a valid a valid NIWI proof for the CRS F = (f1,f2,F ). Namely,
pˆi1 = (pˆi1,1, pˆi1,2, pˆi1,3) and pˆi2 = (pˆi2,1, pˆi2,2, pˆi2,3) satisfy
n∏
i=1
E
(
ι(vi), gˆi
)−1
= E
(
Cz, gˆz
) · E(Cr, gˆr) · E(f1, pˆi1,1) · E(f2, pˆi1,2) · E(F , pˆi1,3)
n∏
i=1
E
(
ι(vi), hˆi
)−1
= E
(
Cz, hˆz
) · E(Cu, hˆu) · E(f1, pˆi2,1) · E(f2, pˆi2,2) · E(F , pˆi2,3) .
The proof is comprised of 26 elements of G, 12 elements of Gˆ and a pair (VK, σ). At the 128-bit
security level, if elements of G and Gˆ can be represented using 256 bits and 512 bits, respectively,
the proof fits within 1.68 kB if the system is instantiated using the one-time signature of [37].
The simulation-soundness property can be proved under a variant of the DLIN assumption.
This assumption posits that the two distributions
D0 = {(f, g, h, gˆ, fa, hb, ga+b, gˆa+b) | f, g, h R← G, gˆ R← Gˆ, a, b R← Zp},
D1 = {(f, g, h, gˆ, fa, hb, gc, gˆc) | f, g, h R← G, gˆ R← Gˆ, a, b, c R← Zp}
are indistinguishable. Note that, in Type II pairings where an isomorphism ψ : Gˆ→ G is efficiently
computable, this assumption is implied by the standard DLIN assumption in Gˆ.
In the security proof, the main changes occur in the proofs of Lemmas 3 and 4. In the former, the
reduction takes as input (f, g, h, gˆ, fa, hb) and twinned challenge values (T, Tˆ ) = (gz, gˆz) ∈ G× Gˆ,
where either z = a + b or z ∈R Zp. The reason why (T, Tˆ ) are both necessary is that, while T is
used to compute σ1 in simulated proofs, implementing the test (15) requires Tˆ to test the equality
e(η?, gˆ) = e(F ?0 , Tˆ ) at the end of the game.
In the proof of Lemma 4, the main change is that, in order to perform an asymmetric analogue
of the test e(η?, g) = e(gω1+ω2 · Rk−1(VK?|k−1), F ?0 ) at the end of the game, the reduction B needs
two correlated random functions
Rk−1 : {0, 1}k−1 → G , Rˆk−1 : {0, 1}k−1 → Gˆ
such that e(Rk−1(VK?|k−1), gˆ) = e(g, Rˆk−1(VK
?
|k−1)) for any VK
? ∈ {0, 1}L in order to test whether
the equality e(η?, gˆ) = e(F ?0 , gˆ
ω1+ω2 · Rˆk−1(VK?|k−1)) holds. This can be simply achieved by defining
Rk−1(VK?|k−1) = g
R′k−1(VK
?
|k−1 ) , Rˆk−1(VK?|k−1) = gˆ
R′k−1(VK
?
|k−1 )
using any random function R′k−1(VK
?
|k−1) : {0, 1}k−1 → Zp.
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